Duty to Warn: The Mental Health Practitioner\u27s Legal Responsibility by Sharko, Madeleine
Loyola University Chicago 
Loyola eCommons 
Master's Theses Theses and Dissertations 
1989 
Duty to Warn: The Mental Health Practitioner's Legal 
Responsibility 
Madeleine Sharko 
Loyola University Chicago 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses 
 Part of the Psychology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sharko, Madeleine, "Duty to Warn: The Mental Health Practitioner's Legal Responsibility" (1989). Master's 
Theses. 3862. 
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/3862 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more 
information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu. 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. 
Copyright © 1989 Madeleine Sharko 




A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate 
School of Loyola University of Chicago in 
Partial Fulfillaent of the Requireaents 
for the degree of 
Master of Arts 
May 
1989 
(c) 1989, Madeleine Sharko 
For Lorraine C. Sharko 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The author thanks her co•mittee whose support and necessary 
recom•endations made this thesis possible. Dr. Kevin Hartigan's 
enthusiasm and encouragement added greatly to the unfolding of this 
study. His proposals were always generative of additional 
viewpoints which helped the author to see the breadth of this work. 
Similarly, his suggestions have incited the author to investigate 
this area of law and psychology beyond the limits of this thesis. 
The author would also like to thank Dr. Terry Williams for his 
assistance in organizing the •aterial and drawing it together as a 
whole. His editing was extremely helpful in making this thesis 
clearer and •ore succinct. Additionally, his concern for the 
structure of the chapters prompted important efforts to make the 
reading proceed logically. 
Both co•mittee members are appreciated for their knowledge of 
the law. 
Finally, the author would like to thank Mr. James Goodridge of 
Loyola University of Chicago's School of Law. His help in 




The author. Madeleine Mary Sharko. is the daughter of Donald 
Theodore Sharko and Lorraine (Supert) Sharko. She was born May 27. 
1963. 
Her ele•entary education was obtained in the parochial schools 
of Chicago, Illinois and Oak Lawn. Illinois. Her secondary 
education was completed in May, 1981 at the Mother McAuley Liberal 
Arts High School. 
In September 1981, Ms. Sharko entered Northwestern University, 
receiving the degree of Bachelor of Arts in English in June, 1985. 
At Northwestern. she was a •ember of the Alpha Lambda Delta Honor 
Society and meaber and president of the Phi Eta Sigma Honor Society. 
During 1984-85. she served as a Resident Advisor to 85 students. 
Ms. Sharko entered the Graduate School of Loyola University in 
August, 1985 where she has been pursuing a Master of Arts degree in 
co•munity counseling through course work and an internship at a 
crisis center for battered women. 
At this time, she is enrolled as a second-year law student at 
the University of Illinois' College of Law at Urbana-Champaign. 
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. 
VITA ..... . 
Chapter 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
II. DEFINITION OF MENTAL HEALTH PRACTITIONER. 
III. HISTORY OF THE DUTY TO WARN 
IV. THE TARASOFF DECISION .. 
V. THE IMPACT OF TARASOFF ON CALIFORNIA. 










VII. CURRENT LEGAL IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. 100 
REFERENCES 127 
APPENDIX A 132 




This thesis is prepared as a means for reviewing the literature 
concerning aental health professionals' duty to warn third-party 
individuals of potentially-dangerous clients. It is intended to 
present the tension between law and psychology, specifically where 
the responsibilities of the therapist as a citizen and as a mental 
health practitioner impose on him/her conflicting expectations. The 
review of literature is meant to illustrate the struggle in 
maintaining strict confidentiality (a major tenet of therapeutic 
work) while at the same time recognizing the obligation to dissolve 
any confidence for the purpose of precluding clients' possible 
illegal actions. It is hoped that this paper will demonstrate the 
/ 
need for further discussion and litigation which will allow the 
practitioner's aethod of procedure in sensitive cases to be 
routinely decided, rather than personally deliberated. 
The information for this paper was located through use of 
professional journals, books, case law and computer systems. 
Examples of professional journals include the Mental Disabilities 
Reporter and Behavioral Sciences and the Law. Examples of books 
include Psychotherapy, Confidentiality, and Privileged 
Communications (1966) by Ralph Slovenko, and The Potentially Violent 
Patient and the Tarasoff Decision in Psychiatric Practice (1985), 
1 
edited by Jaaes Beck. Case law includes that of the California 
state courts along with federal cases found in the Federal Reporter 
and the Federal Supplement. The LUIS coaputer searches at the 
Loyola University Library yielded journal articles such as "From 
Tarasoff to Hopper: The Evolution of the Therapist's Duty to Protect 
Third Parties" (Goodman. 1985). The LEXIS system provided 
approximately 19 cases at the federal district level and 17 cases at 
the federal appeal level within the past nine years. 
As an attempt will be made to show all those involved in the 
mental health field who are affected by the duty to warn. an 
examination of what is considered to be a aental health practitioner 
will be explored first in the next chapter. Because this legal duty 
is intrinsically tied to the therapists' behavior, it is important 
to consider the expectations and roles of these professionals. In 
this way, one might be able to see the extent to which this duty is 
a help as well as a hindrance. The development of new fields in 
psychology is a paradox in that while the breadth of professions 
•akes aore services available (for reasons of convenience. lower 
expense, etc.), each of these specialties presents some difficulty 
in assessing the limit to which the professional may be held liable 
for negligence. Unlike traditionally-recognized careers such as 
psychiatrist or psychologist. •any areas of counseling are not 
shaped by specific definition. A brief examination of licensing 
requirements will show the structure of these professions and their 
ability to absorb the characteristics which are intrinsic to 
traditional fields in psychology and psychiatry. Because the 
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counseling areas are very similar to these two professions. the 
reader will be able to understand how important it is that 
clarification be made of the duty to warn. not only for the sake of 
psychologists and psychiatrists, but for all involved with clients 
in a helping capacity. 
The duty to warn is an ancient legal duty extending back to the 
traditional law of England on which the United States founded their 
own laws. The third chapter of this thesis provides the reader with 
historical background in law, specifically the inception of the duty 
to warn. While presenting the structure of the law and its 
interpretations. effort is also made to set forth values that led 
courts to create a duty to protect third parties involved. Emphasis 
is also placed on later arguments against the duty to protect. 
These anticipate ramifications that could inflate liability and 
allow people to be held accountable beyond their capabilities. Many 
of these arguments are made with the support of Section 315 of the 
Restatement of Torts that confirmed the lack of duty where no 
relationship between the defendant and third-parties existed. It is 
not surprising then that therapists and many others representing the 
mental health fields faithfully maintain adequate, longstanding 
rationales for rejecting imposition of this duty. 
The quintessential case and the first to comment on the 
confrontation between law and psychology is Tarasoff v. Regents of 
the University of California at Berkeley (529 P. 2d 553 (1974)). As 
explained in Chapter IV, the Tarasoff precedent rests on two civil 
cases, the original Tarasoff decision rendered in 1974 (also called 
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"Tarasoff I") and the 1976 rehearing requested by professional 
behavioral and health organizations. aaong them the American 
Psychiatric Association (Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of 
California, 551 P. 2d 334 (1976)). 
The 1974 Tarasoff case concerned the death of a young woman who 
was attending the University of California. Berkeley in 1969. She 
was killed by a graduate student of the same university after she 
rebuffed his advances. The graduate student. Prosenjit Poddar. had 
been seeing a psychologist at the school's clinic prior to the 
aurder. and had disclosed intentions of killing an unnamed but 
identifiable girl. The crux of the issue was whether the therapist 
had a legal duty to warn the victim or her family. The state's 
district court found no duty on the part of either the psychiatrist 
or the police to warn. Plaintiffs appealed and the next court 
looked to both common law principles and the Restatement of Torts in 
order to try to ascertain liability. The court also stated that it 
weighed the policy reasons of nondisclosure by therapists. Its 
first decision was to hold that the complaint could be aaended to 
show a cause of action for the failure to warn. A rehearing 
requested by the American Psychiatric Association and other •ental 
health organizations confused the duty further. and expanded it past 
a warning. 
Tarasoff had profound iapact on California. Other cases 
considering a siailar duty to warn were heard in the state's courts 
almost iaaediately. Also, there has been a substantial aaount of 
duty cases filed in the federal courts of the ninth judicial circuit 
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since Tarasoff. Chapter V traces these cases, along with setting 
forth the relevant studies that have been conducted concerning 
California therapists. 
Although Tarasoff remained within the state courts of 
California. it had tremendous iapact on other state and federal 
courts that were required to examine similar suits for the first 
time. The sixth chapter of this thesis demonstrates the influx of 
duty to warn cases in federal districts across the country. Through 
synopses of these cases. it is shown how courts deliberate in 
implementing such a duty based on the state's approval or rejection 
of the Tarasoff rationales. What is also available from this 
chapter is the identification of those few cases subsequent to 
Tarasoff which had similar notoriety within a certain region and 
acted as new precedent. The final chapter of this thesis looks to 
recent articles of the APA Monitor and similar resources in the 
field of psychology to show the impact of Tarasoff and its progeny. 
Among these are the recent studies showing therapists' inability to 
predict dangerousness. the aeasurable effects that the threat of 
liability has had on various therapists and clients and 
psychologists' reco•mendations for a reasonable standard of care 
which would ult1aately protect them from negligence suits. 
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CHAPTER II 
DEFINITION OF MENTAL HEALTH PRACTITIONER 
Black's Law Dictionary (1983) describes a "practitioner" as one 
"who is engaged in the exercise or eaployaent of any art or 
profession as contrasted with one who teaches such" (p. 611). In 
determining who is a aental health practitioner, then. it seems 
logical to include all those who provide a form of therapy and are 
considered clinicians not academicians. Although this thesis aay 
soaeti•es focus on particular obligations belonging to physicians 
and psychologists. an effort will be •ade to coaaent on all aental 
health professionals. 
Some illustrations of this kind of practitioner can be drawn 
from authors in the field. Several of thea define the aental health 
profession as a "helping" profession. For exaaple, according to 
Braa111er and Shostru• (1982), "help" in a aental health field aeans 
"providing conditions for people to fulfill their needs for 
security, love and respect, self-esteem, decisive action, and self-
actualizing growth'' (p. 3). It also aeans "providing resources and 
skills that enable people to help theaselves" (p. 3). Although 
Braaaer and Shostrua differentiate aaong the clinical and counseling 
practices, the above liaited interpretation seeas to include the 
characteristics intrinsic to all aental health professions. 
Coraier and Coraier (1982) define a helpin2 professional as 
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"so•eone who facilitates the exploration and resolution of issues 
and problems presented by a helpee or a client" (p. 2). They 
continue in saying that a helping relationship has four components: 
someone seeking help, so•eone willing to give help, a helper who is 
capable of treating, and a setting in which effective treat•ent 
•ight occur. They also state that the relationship involves a 
series of stages. For exa•ple, four stages •ight include for•ing 
the relationship, setting goals, selecting strategies, and 
evaluating/terainating. 
Finally, Cavanagh (1982) defines counseling as "a relationship 
between a trained helper and a person seeking help in which both the 
skills of the helper and the ataosphere that be or she creates help 
people learn to relate with the•selves and others in aore growth-
producing ways" (p. 1). Cavanagh emphasizes that a professional 
counselor needs both counseling skills and a helpful personality. 
Cavanagh believes a helpful personality to be the sum of individual 
characteristics which enable a therapist to create a special 
environaent. Within this unique setting, the therapist confidently 
uses the skills for the client's interest and the client trusts the 
therapist. 
According to Cavanagh, there are aany co•ponents in a 
counseling personality. Allong these are warath, patience, and 
sensitivity. Three other aspects, aore specific to the topic of 
this thesis, are trustworthiness, honesty, and strength. Cavanagh 
defines trustworthiness as the ability of the counselor to assure 
the client that confidentiality is absolute. A trustworthy 
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counselor does not cause his/her client to regret having confided in 
the therapist. Similarly, a counselor who e•ploys honesty appears 
genuine. A counselor listens to what the patient says and, in not 
distorting or judging the patient's plight, tries only to understand 
the client's feelings in relation to the facts told. The 
counselor's honesty encourages the client to be equally as honest. 
as the counseling experience rests on the counselor's clear 
interpretation of the situation and unconditional benevolence toward 
the patient. The patient should begin to experience, perhaps for 
the first ti•e, a freedom to be honest without the fear of 
rejection. Finally, a counselor exhibiting strength is able to keep 
himself/herself separate from the person in counseling. Flexibility 
(according to Cavanagh) is also a sign of professional strength. 
These are just so•e of the views held by aental health scholars 
and authors in regard to the role of the •ental health practitioner. 
To be fair in authority, it is also necessary to consult legal 
docuaents defining the titles of various •ental health professionals 
according to education and skill, rather than characteristics. Many 
of these are found in state statutes or codes. For exaaple, the 
Mental Health and Developaental Disabilities Code of Illinois 
describes a "clinical psychologist" as a psychologist registered 
with the Illinois Departaent of Registration and Education who holds 
either a doctoral degree or graduate degree in psychology fro• a 
regionally accredited school and has a specified ainiawa aaount of 
education (Ill. Dept. of Mental Health and Dev. Dis., 1987, Sec. 1-
103(a)(b)). A "psychiatrist" is a "physician ... who has at least 3 
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years of formal training or pri•ary experience in the diagnosis and 
treat•ent of •ental illness" (Sec. 1-121). A "clinical social 
worker" means "a person who (1) has a Master's or doctoral degree in 
social work from an accredited graduate school of social work and 
(2) has at least 3 years of supervised post•aster's clinical social 
work practice which shall include the provision of mental health 
services for the evaluation, treatment and prevention of •ental and 
emotional disorders" (Sec. 1-122.1). 
In its Deceaber 1984 report, the National Clearinghouse on 
Licensure, Enforcement and Regulation, along with the Council for 
State Governments, prepared a report on the state credentialing of 
the behavioral science professions. The professions under study 
included psychology, social work, counseling and •arriage and faaily 
therapy. The report is careful to indicate that a state's 
regulation (registration, certification, licensure) is a newly-
developed •ethod of controlling the •ental health professions. 
Relying on a dictionary definition of behavior, the report 
formulates its own definition of the behavioral sciences and says 
that they are "the scientific study of persons' behaviors as the 
people exist in their environments" (p. 1). Thus, despite the 
different regulatory histories and current standards of each of the 
behavioral sciences, perhaps all can be described as having an 
interest in hu•an interactions. 
The •ajor thrust of the Clearinghouse report is to de•onstrate 
the discrepancies in regulation of the behavioral sciences across 
the states. Unlike the licensure of psychiatrists as physicians, 
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aental health practitioners are subject to different requireaents 
and titles according to their education. experience and residency. 
For example, depending on the state, a practitioner in any given 
behavioral science field may be subject only to registration 
(•ini•um reporting standards), or to aore stringent state agency 
standards of certification. or, finally, to the aost strict 
requireaents of licensure, which aake it illegal for a non-licensed 
person to perform the specified services. 
A study of this report for the purposes of this thesis provides 
an overall understanding of the differences among the aental health 
professions and. subsequently, a succinct definition of each. 
Perhaps this was part of the report's purpose as well. One idea 
therein expressed is that state professional regulation serves to 
delineate the scope of practice for a regulated profession. Those 
responsible for the report state that in identifying the required 
knowledge and skill of the profession, the limitations of the 
practice are outlined. What is included constitutes the function of 
the profession. 
In the initial co•parisons of the behavioral science 
professions, the authors point out that aarriage/faaily therapy 
' seems the narrowest practice under the title but that each of the 
professions can be tied together through the skills of counseling or 
psychology subsumed by each. As Coraier and Coraier (1982) imply, 
these skills aay be understood as those abilities to clarify, 
interpret, and sUllmarize the inforaation presented to the therapist 
by the client. 
The •ental health field can be said to co•prise counselors. 
social workers, psychologists and psychiatrists. The authors argue 
that a difficulty in the regulatory process is that each profession 
aay include such a diverse set of tasks that any given member •ay be 
regulated by different standards, according to the assigned job. 
For example, although the lay•an may conjure one image of the 
"counselor," the report points out that the states, in regulatory 
procedures, discriminate among six different kinds of counselors. 
These are professional counselors, pastoral counselors, drug 
counselors. alcoholism counselors, substance abuse counselors, and 
•arriage and faaily therapists (p. 42). 
The report reveals that all professional counselors seeking 
licensure have at least a Masters-level degree require•ent with 1-3 
years of internship experience. Those states reporting age 
requireaents insist on counselors being at least 18-19 years of age. 
Six states in the survey have continuing education requirements, 
averaging 12-15 hours per year. Not •uch inforaation is available 
on pastoral counselors other than the fact that a Master's is 
usually required with soae internship experience. 
New Haapshire requires continuing education for pastoral 
counselors but does not specify type. Siailarly, not auch is 
revealed for alcoholism or drug counselors other than Virginia 
requiring a 500-hour drug progra• fro• an accredited college for the 
drug counselor and coapletion of a 400-bour alcoholisa prograa for 
alcohol counselors. Each of these counselors in Virginia is 
required to co•plete 60 hours of continuing education every two 
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years. Maine requests 30 semester hours in college-level work and a 
two-year substance abuse internship. It does not require additional 
continuing education courses. It appears that •arriage and family 
therapists need Master-level degrees or !!censure. Florida and 
Georgia request continuing education in this area. 
As of 1985, five states (Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, North 
Carolina, and Texas) e•ploy a scope of practice declaration to 
define the practice of professional counseling, certainly the 
broadest class of counselors. The practice includes "rendering or 
offering to render to individuals, groups, organizations or the 
general public any service involving the application of principles, 
•ethods, or procedures of the counseling professions which include 
but are not restricted to 'counseling, 1 'appraisal activities,' 
'consulting,' 'referral activities,' or 'research activities'' (p. 
43). It is necessary to explain here what each of these •eans. 
According to the report, "counseling" is assistance in understanding 
problems, developing plans and goals, and utilizing talents to •eet 
needs. "Appraisal activities" concern the use of educational tests 
to determine an individual's potential, including his/her aptitudes, 
abilities and interests. "Consulting" occurs when scientific theory 
is researched to provide further understanding of proble•s. 
"Referral activities" are those that analyze data to determine 
problems and consider referrals. "Research activities" include 
constructing and reporting research on hllllan subjects. Marriage 
therapy, on the other hand, is a "specialized service afforded to 
individuals and married couples which centers pri•arily upon the 
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relationship between husband and wife" (p. 43). The paper cites New 
Jersey law because it is •ost representative of states' scope of 
practice: 
The practice of •arriage counselor consists of the application 
of principles, •ethods, and techniques of counseling and 
psychotherapy for the purpose of resolving psychological 
conflict, •odifying perception and behavior, altering old 
attitudes and establishing new ones in the area of •arriage and 
fa•ily life. 
Alternatively, 33 states regulate at least one category of 
social worker in some way (see Table 1). The •ajority of the states 
(23) license or certify at least one level of social worker. 
Regulation is probably prevalent in this field due to the type of 
work, level of responsibility, and type of supervision that the 
social worker may receive. The authors note that there are •any 
different roles which individual social workers perform, but 
nonetheless attempt to characterize the field through reprinting 
Alabama's scope of practice which they believe is representative of 
the •ajority of states: 
Social work [is] the professional activity of helping 
individuals, groups, or co••unities enhance or restore their 
capacity for social functioning and of preventing or 
controlling social proble•s altering societal conditions as a 
•eans toward enabling people to attain their •axi•um potential. 
These objectives are reached through referrals, counseling, 
research and adllinistration of organizations engaging in such 
practice. The authors also cite the National Association of Social 
Workers' Model Scope of Practice in showing that the profession is 
guided toward "enhancing, protecting, or restoring people's capacity 
for social functioning, whether i•paired by physical, enviro1111ental, 
or e•otional factors" (p. 91). This Act also touches on the 
13 
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clinical aspect of social work in that this field has the potential 
for the "application of social work •ethods and values in the 
diagnosis and treat•ent of •ental and e•otional conditions and in 
providing psychotherapy" (p. 91). 
According to this report. states which regulate (whether by 
licensure, certification, or registration) reserve regulation for 
persons with Master-level degrees in social work and several years 
Table 1 
State Regulation of the Behavioral Sciences 
Counselor 
Pastoral, 
State Family Psychologist Social Worker 
AL. L L L 
AK. L 
AZ. c 
AR. L L L 
CA. L L L 
co. L L/L/R* 
CN. c L 
DE. L L 
FL. L L L 
GA. L L L 
HA. L 
ID. L L L 
IL. c R 
IN. c 
IA. L L 
KS. c L 
KY. L L 
LA. c L 
ME. R L R 
MD. c L L 
MA. L L 




MT. L L L 
NE. L 















































































Cited as Table II-1 in State Credentialing of the Behavioral Science 
Professions: Counselors, Psychologists and Social Workers. Prepared 
by the National Clearinghouse on Licensure. Enforcement and 
Regulation and the Council of State Govern•ents. reprinted with 
per•ission. See Appendix A. 
Source: Health Professions Licensure Inforaation Systea, Septe•ber 
1985. 
*Three levels of social work practice are requested. 
**Two levels of social work practice are requested. 
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of supervised work experience. States that have two categories 
either distinguish between Bachelor and Master's degrees with 
appropriate work experience. or between a social worker with a 
Master's degree and one who is licensed for independent practice 
which require additional supervised work experience. States having 
three categories usually co•bine the three distinctions above and 
regulate: a) social workers with a bachelor's degree. b) social 
workers with an advanced degree in social work, and c) social 
workers with an advanced degree in social work and several years of 
supervised work experience. The states that have four categories 
ordinarily recognize an associate degree in addition to the 
categories above. 
Citing Perspectives on Health Occupational Credentialing 
(1979), the committee of the National Clearinghouse shows that while 
the medical profession reflects uniform scopes of practice. the 
field of psychology reveals even greater diversity among the states 
than does social work. 
According to this report, all the states. including Puerto Rico 
and the District of Columbia, regulate psychologists. Most of the 
states (47) regulate through licensure while the rest (five). eaploy 
certification aethods. The authors rely on the Model Practice Act 
prepared by the Aaerican Psychological Association to represent aost 
states' statutes. This states: 
The practice of psychology includes. but is not liaited to, 
psychological testing and evaluation or assessaent of personal 
characteristics such as intelligence. personality, abilities, 
interests and aptitudes: counseling, psychotherapy, hypnosis, 
biofeedback training and behavior therapy; diagnosis and 
treatment of aental and eaotional disorder or disability, 
16 
alcoholism and substance abuse, and the psychological aspects 
of physical illness or disability, psychoeducational 
evaluation, remediation, and consultation. Psychological 
services •ay be rendered to individuals, families. groups, and 
the public (Cited in State Credentialing of the Behavioral 
Sciences, 1986. p. 66). 
The authors go on to say that what seems to be the real 
demarcation for the factions of scopes of practice is whether the 
state's focus is on health services or whether it leans toward a 
wider range of activities which may •ean consultations and/or 
organizational counseling. In a health-services approach. terms 
such as "assessment." "diagnosis," "treatment," or "organic" (as 
relating to brain dysfunctions) aay be found in the state statutes. 
If a state regulates its psychologists through licensure, then 
either a Ph.D. or a Master-level degree integrated with 3-5 years of 
work experience is required. Most states require good moral 
character and half the states have a ainimum age requirement. 
According to the authors •entioned previously, namely Bramaer 
and Shostrum, Cormier and Cormier. and Cavanagh. what seems 
especially important to the therapeutic process is the existence of 
the helping relationship itself. A situation in which one person is 
to professionally help another during a time of emotional 
crisis/stress would undoubtedly have to rest on a foundation of 
trustworthiness, honesty, and good faith. On its face, this seems a 
fair expectation. 
Nonetheless. it is exactly this understanding which. when 
juxtaposed with the therapist's legal responsibilities, changes the 
practitioner's role into an enigaa. For exa.11ple, a therapist who is 
held ethically to •aintain the confidence of his/her client is also 
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expected, even mandated by law, to divulge that confidence when 
he/she knows or suspects that the client is dangerous to 
himself/herself and others. In effect, a third party, unknown to 
the therapist, aay become the plaintiff in a lawsuit later brought 
against the saae therapist. who has consistently tried to act in an 
ethical and trustworthy manner. 
As the states vary in their regulations of mental health 
practitioners. so do they vary in protecting the client through 
privilege statutes. In their book, Privileged Communications in the 
Mental Health Professions, Knapp and Van DeCreek (1987, p. ix) 
differentiate between confidentiality and privilege in explaining 
that the former refers to laws or ethics that govern the privacy of 
information while the latter is a narrower term referring only to 
the legal right that patients may invoke for protection of their 
confidences and preclusion of these for evidence in court. The 
authors explain that Congress or state legislatures determine 
necessary privileged relationships. The process involves a careful 
balancing of benefit and potential harm to society. Also considered 
is the fact that a proper verdict in trial aay not be reached if 
some evidence is withheld from the court. 
Privilege statutes vary. All states include the attorney-
client privilege. Most states include clergy, physicians and 
psychologists. Social workers, counselors, journalists. and nurses 
are protected in some states. Only a few states have privilege laws 
for detectives, trust coapanies, and accountants (pp. 3-4). 
For a considerable time, psychotherapists (including 
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psychiatrists) did not have the protection of a physician-patient 
privilege. Early advocates for the protection of psychological 
interviews pressed for a statute not through reference to the 
physician-client privilege, but rather through showing an important 
difference. They argued that a psychotherapist needs even more 
privilege than a physician because of the nature of the problems 
presented and the social stigma attached to them. 
The authors indicate that state legislatures began to protect 
these relationships only in the late 1940s. No state commented on 
psychotherapy before World War II. Afterwards. however, states 
began to recognize a need for the protection of psychotherapeutic 
communications with the increase of practitioners. Knapp and Van 
DeCreek's review, as of 1985, showed that 47 states and the District 
of Columbia have privileged communications statutes for 
psychologists. Twenty-eight states have privileged communication 
statutes for social workers. Twenty states specifically cover 
psychiatry while 30 other states and the District of Columbia 
protect psychiatrists under the physician-patient privilege. 
Although Tarasoff does not concern privileges, some •ention is 
needed in order to fully unveil disclosure problems. The privilege 
statutes are noteworthy because they are further indication of the 
i•portance that society places on confidentiality. Although 
•entioned originally in the physicians' Hippocratic Oath in the 19th 
century, the idea of absolute privacy has expanded from ethical 
guidelines. This respect for privacy has grown as the •ental health 
professions themselves have grown. Privacy is viewed as such a 
19 
crucial part of treatment that it can now be involved as a legal 
right on behalf of the patient. 
Privilege communication statutes. like the regulations on the 
mental health profession, serve to further define the role of the 
•ental health practitioner. Intrinsic to his/her code of 
professional ethics is an expectation to use reasonable care and to 
keep private what should remain private. The promise of absolute 
secrecy can be considered a genuine component of treataent, a 
special form of "help" not available to the client outside of these 
professional relationships. 
Against this background of aental health practice, the problems 
of Tarasoff and the implications of their resolution will be 
studied. What follows is the birth of duty principles, an 




HISTORY OF THE DUTY TO WARN 
This thesis concerns tort law. An historical overview is 
necessary to lay the groundwork and to unveil the i•plications of 
tort principles which ultimately shaped the Tarasoff decision. The 
thrust of Tarasoff revolved around the concept of duty, specifically 
the •ental health practitioner's duty to warn third parties of 
potentially violent patients. This duty is difficult to qualify: 
perhaps it is best explained as emanating from what is com•only 
called negligence. 
In his article "Evolution of the Duty of Care: Some Thoughts," 
Murphy (1981) traces the develop•ent of duties in the United States 
by beginning with traditional notions established in England during 
the early 19th century. What follows in this third chapter of the 
thesis is a summary of Murphy's construction of the duty to warn. 
The cases cited are those Murphy used to chronicle the development 
of the duty to warn. 
The hallmark case. according to Murphy, was Heaven v. Pender 
(1983) Q.B.D. 503. The plaintiff in this case was a boat painter 
who sustained injuries when the stage next to the boat fell. He 
brought suit against the dock owner with who• he was not in 
relationship (privity of contract), but who nonetheless provided the 
stage so that the boat could be painted. This was first court to 
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consider duty as developing fro• foreseeability. Lord Esher used 
the Pender case to say that a duty is defined as the relation which 
becomes apparent in an inherently dangerous situation. He 
illustrated this by two ship captains who assume a duty toward each 
other at the realization that their individual ships •ay crash into 
one another. It has been said that Esher's theory was innovative 
because it was a•ong the first to describe duty in terms of 
foreseeability and relationship, not solely privity. Privity, 
according to Black's Law Dictionary (1983), is the "mutual or 
successive relationships to the same right of property, or such an 
identification of interest of one person with another as to 
represent the same legal right" (p. 626). Coined "the larger 
proposition," Esher's theory was said to be founded in humanism and 
natural law. 
Pender may be thought to have been precedent for many ensuing 
American cases. Yet, Murphy is careful to point out that a case 
based on similar reasoning had already been decided in the States 30 
years prior to Pender. Thomas v. Winchester (1852). held a 
manufacturer of poisonous pharmaceuticals liable despite the lack of 
contract or privity between the manufacturer and the 
consumer/plaintiff. Here, the duty of care was said to arise from 
the nature of the profession and the defendant's awareness of the 
possibility of illness or death after ingestion of defectively 
•anufactured or i•properly labeled drugs. Probably a aajor reason 
for the increase in finding liability was the fact that Winchester 
involved a toxic substance and that it would see• unconscionable to 
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allow liability to pass on technical grounds. Thus, at the 
beginning of the 20th century, both England and the United States 
were •utually affirming that duty need not be confined to the 
traditional context of privity, especially in terms of inherently 
dangerous situations. Rather, both courts were willing to rely on 
humanistic theories for anticipating liability. 
Murphy explains that in 1916, New York courts expanded on the 
Winchester decision by finding a •anufacturer of a defectively-
designed wheel liable to subsequent accident and injury to the 
plaintiff/car buyer (MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.). The court 
reasoned that such a product can be as dangerous to human life as 
the poison in the Winchester case. Winchester also relied on Pender 
that disregarded the need for formal privity relationships between 
the parties. Rather, as in Winchester, a duty evolved to those 
reasonably foreseeable victims. users of the product. 
An interesting twist of events happened in this country in 1928 
with the New York decision of H.R. Moch v. Rennselaer Water Co .. 
Here, Justice Cardozo had the opportunity to rely on above-named 
cases for allowing recovery to a plaintiff who suffered fire damage 
when the water company neglected to properly channel water to 
hydrants. The proble• was clearly foreseeable. It seems that it 
could certainly have been said that the water company's obligation 
to the plaintiff was narrower than that of the company to huaanity 
at large, and that there were identifiable victims. Genuine human 
interests were at stake. 
Nonetheless. Cardozo's reasoning swung the decision in the 
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opposite direction, and liability was found not to exist based on 
the fact that there was no relationship similar to "privity." 
Instead of relying on MacPherson and Winchester precedent. Cardozo 
retreated by resorting to the clear, yet seemingly oversimplified 
rationale of the ancient English case of Winterbotto• v. Wright 
(1842). In Winterbottom, a passenger of a stagecoach could not sue 
the manufacturer of the carriage for injuries sustained due to the 
lack of privity. Cardozo reasoned that a stage coach was not like a 
poison. or even a defective wheel: it was not dangerous by itself. 
Thus. Cardozo aade a conscious effort in H.R. Moch to keep alive 
ancient notions of duty lest they die out with the incursion of 
foreseeability and relational concepts found in the line of cases 
beginning with Winchester. 
Murphy explains that in 1928, then. there were two distinct but 
coexisting forms of tort law in the United States. For the next six 
years. courts had to choose between which of these was better law in 
individual circuastances. A major stance was finally taken in 1934 
with the compilation of the Restateaent of Torts. Following aore 
the Winterbottom theory on duty, the Restate•ent said in Section 314 
that "The actor's realization that action on his part is necessary 
for another's aid or protection does not of itself iapose upon him a 
duty to take such action" (p. 854). It also said in section 315 
that there was no duty to control the conduct of another unless 6 
special relationship existed between the first person and the one 
whose conduct needed to be controlled or if a special relationship 
existed between the first person and the potential victi• where in 
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the latter situation. there would be a duty to protect. Section 319 
stated that one who of his/her own volition took charge of another 
person known or likely to be dangerous is obliged to control the 
person fro• doing harm. Section 320 made clear that one exercising 
custody over another is obliged to protect that person from harm by 
others if the custodian knows or should know that he/she has ability 
to control conduct of the other and if he/she knows or should know 
of the necessity for exercising the control. There were some 
exceptions for a duty to control and protect but these were limited 
to special relationships such as parent/child, •aster/servant, owner 
of land/licensee. Mention is also made of those who are in charge 
of persons having dangerous propensities. 
An application of the Restatement yielded Richards v. Stanley 
in 1954. Here, there was no liability for a defendant who left his 
keys in his care. thereby indirectly allowing a thief to take the 
automobile and subsequently injure a plaintiff. Although the act 
was foreseeable by the defendant. and although the defendant could 
be said to have so•e duty to protect nearby pedestrians. the court 
found through application of the Restatement that no privity existed 
between the defendant and the injured plaintiff. No obligation on 
the part of the defendant could be found. 
Murphy cites in a footnote an important article having 
co•menting on the i•plications of the Restatement. Entitled "The 
Duty to Control the Conduct of Another." (1934), authors Harper and 
Kime co••ented on the policy of tort law at that ti•e in ter•s of 
its "relational character.• In stating that human beings constantly 
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enter into relationships, tenuous and otherwise, these authors 
explained that only current social policies really distinguish those 
relationships which demand special protection. They continued by 
stating that coamon law is an atteapt to incorporate the attitude of 
the coamunity into legal rules. Although they added that the 
categories were flexible. Harper and Kime were nonetheless eager to 
identify potential problems with the development of the duty to warn 
at the time. Thus, they felt that when ... "novel cases involving 
the problem arise, it will becoae the duty of the judges to exaaine 
the analogies of such cases as (already) are discussed ... and to 
determine whether, in the light of human experience as reflected in 
the decisions. the relations of the parties fall into one or the 
other of the general divisions aentioned" (p. 905). 
Although Tarasoff was not to arrive until years later. legal 
scholars at the tiae of the first Restateaent could already see the 
fallibility in clinging only to the deaarcations set out in Section 
315. 
It was the Restatement of Torts (Second) in 1985 that 
enuaerated the exceptions. in fora of particular professions, to the 
no-duty rule. These included persons known as co•mon carriers. 
innkeepers, possessors of land, and those. such as police or prison 
wardens who actually took soaeone subject to their control. These 
exceptions were based on all of the tort cases. with the exception 
of one. that had occurred between 1934 and 1985. 
Murphy explains that this second Restateaent. however. still 
only acknowledged relationships that were already socially 
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recognized and did not consider the relationship that "evolved" as 
that in Pender. Cases like Pender would have to be reconciled, 
indeed co•pro•ised, under one of the strict categories in the 
Restatement. As stated before. this will later be seen as one of 
the initial handicaps that coaplicated the Tarasoff case a few years 
later. 
According to Murphy, the second Restateaent was initiated after 
many conflicting cases had come to the court. For exa•ple, Wright 
v. Arcade {1964) refused recovery to a five-year-old injured by a 
school bus because the boy had no relationship with the school 
district. On the other hand, the court in Rayaond v. Paradise the 
previous year found liability against the bus company because there 
was no supervision in a bus loading zone. an areas which the court 
thought was deaonstrative of a general relationship between the bus 
coapany and its passengers. In response to these cases. Murphy says 
that the juxtaposition of the cases reveals a tendency to rely on 
Section 315's "special relationship" analysis when the court was 
determined to avoid liability, and a decision to find a general 
relationship through the special circuastances of the Section when 
the court wanted to establish a duty. 
The purported cornerstone case at this tiae, however. was Aaaya 
v. Hoae, Ice, and Fuel Co. (1963). Here, in Alllaya, there was the 
final shift in California fro• a no-duty rule to that of a general 
duty of care founded on foreseeability. Murphy points out three 
aajor ra11ifications of Amaya: 1) Aaaya was the first return to the 
Pender reasoning since MacPherson: 2) Because of Aaaya, the no-duty 
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concept would still be available but only through aanipulating the 
reasance dichotoay and the privity concept. Consequently, Section 
315 would have a bigger role to play in liability-denying rationales 
because it would be the strongest precedent for showing no duty 
absent a special relationship; 3) Amaya shows the deaarcation 
between the no-duty factions and the pro-duty factions in terms of 
the subject of huaan safety. 
Subsequent to the second Restateaent, Dillon v. Legg (1968) 
overruled Allaya in saying that a "zone of danger" standard was too 
strict in limiting foreseeability. With the Rowland v. Christian 
case. the saae California court aoved further to abolish the no-duty 
rule. Rowland concerned personal injury to a friend of the 
defendant when plaintiff cut hiaself on a water faucet in 
defendant's house. The ruling in Rowland abandoned classifications 
of trespassers, licensees, and invitees along with respective duties 
of care that had been owed to each group by the landowner up to this 
time. 
Murphy explains that in leaving the no-duty rule coapletely. 
the courts sought to define a general duty of care. This kind of 
duty could be ascertained through the asking of two basic questions. 
In order to find liability in a situation, the court would first ask 
if "there was a sufficient relationship of proxiaity or neighborhood 
such that in reasonable conteaplation carelessness on one's part 
would likely cause damage" (p. 167). If so, there existed a "prima 
facie duty." The second question to ask would be if there were any 
considerations which ought to negate or liait the scope of the duty. 
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The answer to the second question would be the initial deter•inative 
answer of liability. 
According to Murphy, Rowland was iaportant because it appeared 
as the first "definitive" stateaent in the United States adopting 
the larger proposition found in Pender. Murphy points out that 
there was a feeling that this fundamental principle that was foraed 
would aake no distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance. 
According to Black's Law Dictionary, aisfeasance is the i•proper 
performance of an act which is lawful. while nonfeasance is the 
omission of something which a person ought to do. 
These were the developaents that had thus far occurred by the 
time Tarasoff reached the courts. Murphy explains that the two 
lines of tort develop•ent. the first representative of the Pender-
Rowland "larger principle" doctrine and the other traceable to 
Winterbottom (and evidenced in Section 315 of the Restatement), 
combined in the Tarasoff case. In finding the defendant 
psychotherapists liable for their failure to warn. the court relied 
on both the funda•ental principle fro• Rowland and the special 
relationship analysis of Section 315 of the Restatement. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE TARASOFF DECISION 
The Tarasoff precedent rests on two civil cases, the original 
Tarasoff decision rendered in 1974 (also called "Tarasoff I") and 
the 1976 rehearing requested by professional behavioral and health 
organizations, among them the American Psychiatric Association. The 
second hearing was an effort to alleviate the fears of 
psychotherapists who confronted new, unclear responsibilities as a 
result of Tarasoff. Dr. Ja•es C. Beck, author of The Potentially 
Violent Patient and the Tarasoff Decision in Psychiatric Practice 
(1985), said that the 1976 ruling was even •ore distressful than the 
first as the duties for psychotherapists were expanded. but not 
clarified (p. 6). 
It is also extremely important to note that the Tarasoff 
opinion does not deteraine whether Dr. Moore, the •urderer's 
psychologist, or the University of California outpatient clinic was. 
in fact, negligent. The case only purports that there is a cause of 
action to be tried and that the case is appropriate for remand to 
the lower courts. There, the findings of fact, the jury. are still 
free to determine whether or not Dr. Moore had used due care and 
saved himself from negligence. Unfortunately, the case never 
reached remand because it was settled out of court before retrial. 
These unfortunate circu•stances add to the confusion of aental 
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health practitioners' understanding as to what constitutes 
negligence (Reisner, 1985, p. 105). 
The facts of the Tarasoff cases represent one year in the lives 
of Prosenjit Poddar and Tatiana Tarasoff. two students at the 
University of California at Berkeley. A graduate student, Poddar 
met Miss Tarasoff at a folk dance in October of 1968. They saw each 
other at social events approxi•ately once a week. Poddar thought 
that the relationship was serious, but Tatiana told him that it was 
not. There are no explanations for Tatiana's response in the cases 
nor com•enting texts. As a result of her refusals. Poddar beca•e 
withdrawn and cried often. His speech was erratic. He ignored his 
work. He was preoccupied with his infatuation and spent hours with 
his rooamate analyzing tape-recorded conversations with Tatiana. He 
aentioned being in love with Tatiana. During the next su•mer, 
Tatiana left for South Allerica. Poddar, suffering from a lack of 
concentration and unable to pursue his studies. entered outpatient 
psychotherapy at the Cowell Me•orial Hospital of the University of 
California on June 5. 1969. 
What aay see• additionally iaportant, especially for the 
purposes of this research. is that Poddar was of Indian background 
and a ae•ber of the Harijan caste, those known as "untouchable." A 
very brief description of the caste syste• aay be in order. In 
India, the •ajority of people (approximately 83~) are Hindus, 
followed by Muslias (approxi•ately 11%), then Christians and 
Buddhists. The Hindus are aeparated into social classes or castes. 
Each caste is usually associated with a specific occupation (priest, 
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artist, faraer), and the caste serves as a peraanent identification. 
A person is born into a caste and cannot leave it. There is a 
particular set of rules governing conduct for each caste; aarriage 
rarely occurs between aeabers of different castes. For aany years, 
a group called "untouchables" has been considered perhaps the lowest 
social class in that its •embers exist outside the caste systea and 
rank even below the lowest caste. They are a ainority, coaprising 
only about 15% of the Indian population. Although the 1950 Indian 
Constitution &11eliorated the untouchables' social status soaewhat by 
granting them equal rights as full citizens, there are still a 
nuaber of Hindus who believe that this group should not encroach on 
society (World Book Encyclopedia, 1985, pp. 100-101). 
With this background available on Poddar. it aight be useful 
from a psychological perspective to speculate on his aotives for 
pursuing Tatiana and the reasons for his increasing despair over her 
rebuffs. Martin E.P. Seligaan, a clinical and experiaental 
psychologist, has studied the experience of "helplessness" and how 
it is tied to eaotional disturbance. He states in his book, 
entitled Helplessness (1975), that this kind of despair is "the 
psychological state that frequently results when events are 
uncontrollable" (p. 9). Although auch of his book centers on 
laboratory experiaents, he insists that the results can be 
analogized to eaotional and psychological breakdowns in huaans. He 
says that organisas which are capable of learning helplessness 
suffer a decrease in aotivation, an inability to recognize success, 
and a heightening of eaotion. Thus. in light of the fact that 
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poddar learned that he was born into a caste about which he could do 
nothing, and in light of the apparent weakness of the Indian people 
to fully accept the idea of "untouchables" as full citizens, Poddar 
aay have seen Tatiana's rejection as further proof of his 
helplessness and his genuine inability, despite fervent effort, to 
obtain what he desired. 
Although the counsel for Poddar did not assert a defense of 
helplessness, they did seek to de•onstrate diminished capacity. 
Defense implored the courts to allow the testi•ony of an 
anthropologist who had lived in India for 20 years and had 
particularly studied problems that Indian students had in adjusting 
to Allerican universities. It was hoped that her testiaony could 
substantiate a direct link between the stress endured by Poddar and 
his aotivation for killing Tatiana. Although the court invited the 
defense council to pose relevant. hypothetical questions to the 
anthropologist, it did not allow the defense counsel to use the 
witness as an expert. The court reasoned that diainished capacity 
was a mental illness that was subject to direct testiaony only by 
those professionals in the aental sciences. 
Unlike his usual practice, Dr. Gold, the psychiatrist who 
evaluated Poddar at Cowell, told Poddar at the first interview that 
his behavior was quite abnoraal and could be diagnosed as paranoid 
schizophrenic .. The psychiatrist was a aember of the inpatient staff 
and decided that Poddar did not require hospitalization. He 
prescribed a neuroleptic (a tranquilizer and antipsychotic drug) and 
then referred Poddar to Dr. Moore, a clinical psychologist on the 
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outpatient staff who conducted weekly psychotherapy. 
On August 18, 1969 during one of his therapeutic sessions. 
Poddar disclosed thoughts of haraing, or even killing an unnamed 
girl. She was, however, identifiable to Dr. Moore as Miss Tarasoff. 
According to the criminal case, People v. Poddar (1972) (summarized 
in Appendix B). Poddar also told a aale friend his intention to kill 
Miss Tarasoff, by possibly blowing up her rooa. He also disclosed 
to either this person or another friend that he felt he could not 
control hi•self. The court does not see• disturbed by the lack of 
facts concerning how Dr. Moore could identify the victim. In a 
footnote to the 1976 rehearing, the court says that "We recognize 
that in some cases it would be unreasonable to require the therapist 
to interrogate his patient to discover the victia's identity ... But 
there •ay also be cases in which a mo•ent's reflection will reveal 
the victim's identity" (p. 345, fn.11.). 
Dr. Moore also apparently learned from a friend of Poddar that 
Poddar planned to purchase a gun. Details about this conference are 
scarce. The criainal case states that grounds of premeditation 
included Poddar's possessing a gun and asking if that kind of gun 
could kill someone. The record does not disclose to whom he asked 
this question. Dr. Moore became concerned about Poddar and 
consulted with Dr. Gold and the assistant to the director of the 
departaent of psychiatry, Dr. Yandell. After deciding that Poddar 
needed hospitalization, Dr. Moore phoned and then wrote to caapus 
police on August 20th, explaining that Poddar's dangerousness aet 
California's civil coaaitaent criteria, that he was probably 
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paranoid schizophrenic, and that he should be detained 
involuntarily. Whether or not Poddar actually aet the coamitaent 
criteria is not discussed in the analysis of Tarasoff. Focus is on 
the relevant civil coamitment statute. the Lanteraan-Petris-Short 
Act. in order to deteraine whether the defendant psychotherapists 
could enjoy the iamunity therein described for government officials. 
According to the case, the County of Alaaeda had never appointed the 
Cowell Memorial Hospital, nor any of its aembers to begin 
involuntary co .. itaent proceedings in accordance with the Welfare 
and Institution Code. Despite the fact that, according to the Act, 
the lacked status to aake coamitaent judgMent, the Court nonetheless 
awarded the• iaaunity on the basis of their power to make 
recoamendations for coaaitaent. 
Campus police aid was requested in coaaitting hia. Three 
ca•pus police officers, one with whoa Dr. Moore had previously 
spoken, interviewed Poddar extensively and decided that he was 
rational and not dangerous. Although it is uncertain what Poddar 
said, he promised to stay away fro• Tatiana and was then released. 
According to plaintiffs' allegations, Dr. Powelson, Director of 
the Department of Psychiatry at the ti•e, ordered that no further 
action be taken to place Poddar in a 72-hour facility. Dr. Powelson 
asked the police to return Dr. Moore's letter and also ordered that 
all copies of the letter and notes that Dr. Moore had taken as 
therapist be destroyed. As the cases do not disclose any of 
Powelson's stateaents, one can only speculate as to his aotives for 
ordering these actions. Perhaps he feared appearing to have 
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authority to coaait Poddar. Neither Tatiana nor anyone in her 
family was notitied of the threats nor the behavior of Poddar that 
would suggest his violent tendencies toward plaintiff. Poddar did 
not stay in treatment. Although reasons are not stated, it may be a 
result of his being detained by the police and thus, his losing 
confidence in Dr. Moore. At this tiae, he then befriended Tatiana's 
brother and encouraged hia to be his roommate. Tatiana, who had 
been in Brazil. returned to Berkeley in the fall of 1969 and again 
rejected Poddar's advances. 
On October 27, 1969, Poddar went to Ms. Tarasoff 1 s home. She 
was absent and Tatiana's mother, perhaps sensing danger, asked him 
to leave. Poddar, however, returned later with a pellet gun and a 
butcher knife, to find Ms. Tarasoff alone. She refused to talk with 
him and began screaming. He shot her with a pellet gun and she ran 
fro• the house. He followed her and stabbed her to death. 
Afterwards, he called the police and requested that he be 
handcuffed. 
Subsequent to the death of their daughter, the Tarasoffs sued 
the University, including both the campus police and the student 
health service psychotherapists. In their allegations, the 
Tarasoffs said that the psychotherapists had been negligent in not 
warning Ms. Tarasoff of Poddar's threats and in not confining him. 
They also charged that the police had been negligent in only 
questioning Poddar and in not detaining hia further. 
The defendants (collectively, the University of California) 
deaurred. In essence, they asserted that the plaintiffs had no 
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cause of action to pursue, even if all of the facts were true. They 
said that even if the plaintiffs' allegations were true, there 
really was no legal duty on the part of either the psychotherapists 
or the police to protect or to warn. The court accepted this 
argument and dis•issed the Tarasoffs' complaint on the grounds that 
it failed to state a cause of action. The Tarasoffs appealed and 
this led to Tarasoff I which was decided Deceaber 28, 1974. 
The plaintiffs' complaint concerned four causes of action 
comprising two grounds of liability: 1) Defendants' failure to warn 
plaintiffs of the impending danger. and 2) Defendants' failure to 
use reasonable care to bring about Poddar's confine•ent. Defendants 
asserted that they owed no duty of reasonable care to Tatiana and 
that they were i••une fro• suit under the California Torts Clai• Act 
of 1963. As an aside, the Act allows indemnification of employees 
against liability, so long as there is no bad faith. The defense 
relied on the Act because specific sections of its Govern11ent code 
allowed i•aunity for governaent officials who exercise discretionary 
commitment decisions. 
The court found liability on two rationales for the first 
ground. The court found defendants not liable on the second ground. 
The plaintiffs' four causes of action include: 1) Failure to 
detain a dangerous patient, 2) Failure to Warn on a Dangerous 
Patient, 3) Abandon•ent of a Dangerous Patient, and 4) Breach of 
Pri•ary Duty to Patient and the Public (p. 341). The first cause of 
action sketches the chronology of how Moore had consulted with 
psychiatrists at Cowell Meaorial Hospital, had notified ca•pus 
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police that Poddar would be detained, and had requested the aid of 
the police depart•ent in assisting hi•. 
Plaintiffs' second cause of action, "Failure to Warn on a 
Dangerous Patient," incorporates the charges of the first cause. but 
also adds that the defendants negligently per•itted Poddar to be 
released from police custody without "notifying the parents of 
Tatiana Tarasoff that their daughter was in grave danger fro• 
Prosenjit Poddar" (p. 341). 
Plaintiff's third cause of action, "Abandonment of a Dangerous 
Patient," sought $10,000.00 in punitive damages against defendant 
Dr. Powelson. The complaint stated that Powelson "did the things 
herein alleged with intent to abandon a dangerous patient, and said 
acts were done •aliciously and oppressively" (p. 341). 
Plaintiff's fourth cause of action, "Breach of Priaary Duty to 
Patient and the Public," states allegations si•ilar to the first 
cause of action, but it seeks to characterize defendants' conduct as 
a breach of duty to safeguard their patient and the public. The 
court says that the first and fourth causes of action are 
essentially the sa•e allegations. 
In analyzing the real substance of the co•plaint, the second 
cause of action, the court first refers to Dillon v. Legg in saying 
that liability is usually found where there are allegations of 
negligence, proxiaate cause. and da•ages. The defendants' argument 
here is that in the circu•stances of the present case, they 
(defendants) owed no duty of care to Tatiana or her parents and 
that, in the absence of such duty, they were free to act in 
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disregard for Tatiana's life. 
The court expounds on its theory of "duty" by saying that 
duties are not facts to be discovered, but are conclusory 
expressions found in particular cases. The court also refers to 
Prosser (1964) who said that "[Duty] is not sacrosanct in itself, 
but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of 
policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is 
entitled to protection" (cited in Tarasoff I, p. 557). 
Rowland v. Christian was consulted for a listing of so•e of 
those policy considerations. These included: the foreseeability of 
har• to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff 
suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the 
defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the •oral bla•e 
attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future 
harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to 
the com11unity of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting 
liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of 
insurance for the risk involved (69 Cal. 2d 108, 1113). 
The Court ad•its that under co••on law, one generally owes no 
duty to control the conduct of another (Richards v. Stanley) nor to 
warn those endangered by such conduct (Rest. 2d Torts. Sec. 314). 
However, the court is also careful to point out that courts have 
noted exceptions to this rule. According to the court, there have 
been two situations where courts have !•posed a duty of care: (1) 
cases in which the defendant stands in so•e special relationship to 
either the person whose conduct needs to be controlled or in a 
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relationship to the foreseeable victim of that conduct (Secs. 315-
320), and (2) cases in which the defendant has engaged, or 
undertaken to engage, in affiraative action to control the 
anticipated dangerous conduct or to protect the prospective victi• 
(Sec. 321-324a). Both exceptions apply to the facts of this case. 
In turning first to the special relationship part of the 
pleadings, the court notes that a relationship of defendant 
therapists to either Tatiana or Poddar will suffice to establish a 
duty of care. The court concludes that there is a relationship here 
between the defendants and Poddar. It is a relationship of the kind 
that exists between a patient and his/her doctor. 
The court also set some precedent here in saying that although 
the California decisions that recognize duty have involved cases in 
which the defendant stood in a special relationship both to the 
victia and to the person whose conduct created the danger, that duty 
should not be limited to such situations. Such a strong requirement 
precludes liability in valid cases concerning an important and 
influential relationship. The court looks to other jurisdictions to 
decide that the single relationship of a doctor to his/her patient 
is sufficient to support the duty to use reasonable care to warn of 
dangers e•anating fro• the patient's illness. The court decided 
that a doctor or psychotherapist treating a aentally ill patient is 
treating soaeone who presents a danger as serious and as foreseeable 
as does the carrier of a contagious disease. 
Next, the court also points out that Poddar broke off all 
contact with the health center after his contact with the police. 
40 
The plaintiffs assert that it aight be inferred that the defendants 
aay have then acquired a duty in contributing to Poddar's 
dangerousness. Similarly, and along the sa•e lines, it was the 
defendants' obligations to strive to continue servicing Poddar after 
his having become a patient, and even after his having left therapy. 
In defense of their position, the defendants advanced two 
policy considerations for a refusal to iapose a duty upon 
psychotherapists to warn third parties of danger arising from 
violent intentions of a patient. First of all, defendants point out 
that therapy patients often express ideas of violence, but rarely 
carry them out. It is extremely difficult to ascertain those who 
would be likely to carry out the threats. Secondly, the defendants 
argue that free and open communication is a crucial part of 
psychotherapy and that a warning to a third party is a breach of 
trust. 
Responding to the first policy concern, the court answers that 
the standard of care here is no •ore difficult to deteraine than 
that standard for physicians or other professionals. The court 
deter•ines that although an individual psychotherapist's standard of 
care may vary, the psychotherapist is still held to that general 
standard "ordinarily possessed and exercised by •e•bers of [his] 
profession under similar circu•stances" (Bardesono v. Michels 
(1970)). Replying to the second policy reason, the court says that 
it acknowledges the public interest in confidential treat•ent, but 
that the public interest in protection from assault aust also be 
weighed. It explains that the legislature has tried to balance the 
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concerns through establishing a broad rule of privilege for patients 
and psychotherapists (Evidence Code 1014). The court also 
indicates, however, that Evidence Code 1024 contains a limited 
exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege when the patient 
is believed to be dangerous to himself or others. The court 
continues by stating that the revelation of such a co .. unication is 
not a breach of trust under the Medical Ethics of the ~erican 
Medical Association (1957) Section 9, because as stated therein, a 
physician is required to do so in order "to protect the welfare of 
the individual or of the co1R11unity" (p. 347). This court reverses 
the judgment of the superior court, and determines that plaintiffs' 
complaint can be amended to show a cause of action. The court 
concludes: "The protective privilege ends where the public peril 
begins" (p. 347). 
In determining the second prong of the defense, the reliance on 
the Torts Clai• Act of 1963, the court focuses on Section 820.2 of 
the Government Code in order to determine whether public officials 
are protected by governmental i .. unity as a result of their status 
as public officials. Through studying past cases, the court finds 
that i•munity is given to those who exercise discretionary policy 
decisions, not basic policy decisions. The court says: "We require 
of publicly e•ployed therapists only that quantum of care which the 
co•mon law requires of private therapists, that they use that 
reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and conscientiousness 
ordinarily exercised by meabers of their profession" (p. 351). 
Section 820.2 does not shield the therapists from liability for 
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failure to warn. 
The court does, however, sustain defendant therapists' 
contention that Section 856 of the Govern•ent Code protects them 
from liability for failing to confine Poddar, that failure 
consisting the plaintiffs' first and fourth causes of action. 
Section 856 determines liability only where the defendant has 
failed, through act or omission, to carry out a determination to 
confine or not to confine. The court here finds, first of all, that 
Dr. Powelson automatically fits within this exception because he 
•ade a decision, and followed through with it. It seems that he 
cannot be charged with the intent to abandon a dangerous patient if 
he. as director of the departaent, and superior to Dr. Moore, is 
merely disagreeing with his subordinate's decision and following 
through faithfully on his own deliberations. Additionally, then, 
Dr. Powelson is also exempt from the punitive damages for this 
alleged failure, and plaintiff's third cause of action fails. 
Dr. Moore's exercise of decision is •ore difficult to ascertain 
because he initially differed with Powelson. Nonetheless, the court 
decided that Dr. Moore's action in not overturning Dr. Powelson's 
decision was an act of compliance, and really a decision to go along 
with Dr. Powelson. Whether this coapliance was a result of clinical 
reevaluation or an atte•pt to ingratiate himself at the health 
center is unclear. Dr. Moore did assert at trial that he was 
obliged to obey the decision of his e•ployer. Inforaation about 
Powelson's order, the date of its issuance, and Powelson's authority 
over Moore are not entirely discussed in the facts. Thus, the first 
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and fourth causes of action, referring to liability for failure to 
detain the patients fail. 
In regard to the police officers, the court consults Section 
5154 of the Welfare and Institutions Code and finds that they are 
i•mune from liability as are "peace officers," aentioned in the 
code, "who are responsible for the detainaent of the person" (p. 
353). 
According to Goodman, author of "From Tarasoff to Hopper: The 
Evolution of the Therapist's Duty to Protect Third Parties" (1985), 
the holding in Tarasoff I, then, was sufficiently narrow. There was 
a duty to warn only the potential victim. Other causes of action 
were blocked by goverllllental iamunity. There were background 
histories for the two different bases used by the court for iaposing 
the duty to warn. First of all, the court relied on an article by 
Fleaing and Maxi•ov (1974) entitled "The Patient or His Victia: The 
Therapist's Dileama" to declare that the relationship which arises 
between a patient and psychotherapist supports affiraative duties on 
the part of the therapist for the benefit ot third parties. 
Next, the court relied on extra-jurisdictional cases which 
iaposed a duty to warn in order to find that the duty of the 
therapist treating a person with violent tendencies was analogous to 
the carrier of a contagious disease or the driver whose condition or 
aedication affected his ability to drive safely. These ideas were 
based on policy judgments expressed in Richards v. Stanley (1954) 
that, in such situations, the person aost likely to foresee or 
prevent an injury should be held responsible for taking steps toward 
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prevention. Also, as already noted earlier, Good•an also indicates 
that the Restateaent (Second) of Torts, Section 315, was first used 
by the court in the 1974 decision to find the psychotherapist-
patient relationship to be a "special relationship" and an exception 
to the coa•on law rule that ffone person owed no duty to control the 
conduct of another" (p. 557, citing Richards vs. Stanley 217 P. 2d 
23 (1954)). 
By 1976, the Allerican Psychiatric Association (APA), in 
collaboration with other professional organizations, had filed an 
aaicus curiae ("friend of the court") brief asking the Supreae Court 
to rehear the appeal. 
These professionals were worried that requiring therapists to 
warn potential victias would lead to aany aore breaches of patients' 
right to confidentiality. They argued that given the isolated 
instances of violence, aany predictions would be falsely positive. 
Consequently, the aajority of these breaches would serve no purpose 
other than to instill anxiety in the potential victia, and would, 
coincidentally, undermine the patient's confidence in the therapist 
and the therapeutic process. 
Also, soae psychotherapists believed that they would be obliged 
to alert patients routinely about the duty to warn. They 
anticipated the deleterious effect of telling a patient at beginning 
of therapy that certain things the patient aight say could alert the 
therapist to warn third parties. They saw the negative effect such 
a warning would have in preventing the patient froa disclosing 
affect-laden fantasies, through process essential to accoaplishing 
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the work of psychotherapy. The APA's fervor was strong enough to 
persuade the California Supre•e Court to rehear the case. In 1976, 
a second opinion was issued. It is known as "Tarasoff II." 
The court again held that a psychotherapist has a duty to the 
potential victim but relied on Beck (1985), to define that duty •ore 
broadly and with •ore breadth for professional judgment by the 
therapist (p. 5). The court said: "The discharge of this duty may 
require the therapist to take one or •ore of various steps depending 
upon the nature of the case. Thus, it •ay call for him to warn the 
intended victi• or others likely to apprise the intended victim of 
danger, to notify the police, or to take whatever steps are 
reasonably necessary under the circumstances" (p. 340). The second 
opinion, then, •odified the duty to warn as defined in the first 
Tarasoff opinion. Beck (1985) saw the result as a duty to protect 
(p. 5). 
He also points out that the court's opinion was not unanimous: 
only four of the seven judges concurred. Judge Mosk agreed that 
there was a cause of action because defendants did predict violence 
and failed to warn. He doubted that negligence would be found 
because the defendants had notified the police. He could not 
concur, however, in the •ajority's rule that a therapist •ay be held 
liable for failing to predict his patient's tendency to violence if 
other practitioners, pursuant to the "standards of the profession," 
would have done so. He finds that the standards are hard to 
discern. Psychiatrist predictions of violence are virtually 
unreliable and may vary considerably from one professional to 
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another. 
In a separate dissent, Judge Clark agreed with the APA •e•bers 
that the new duty would not increase public safety. Clark said "the 
majority fails to recognize that ... overwhel•ing policy 
considerations •andate against sacrificing funda•ental patient 
interests without gaining a corresponding increase in public 
benefit" (p. 353). 
Beck says that the second opinion is unclear because it does 
not specify who is subject to the duty. The case itself involved a 
psychologist and a psychiatrist, but nothing was said about social 
workers, nurse-therapists or counselors (p. 6). Nor did the opinion 
spell out the steps necessary to discharge the duty of protection. 
Most i•portantly, the opinion left unanswered how the therapist is 
to know when he/she should deter•ine. or how he/she should deter•ine 
that his/her patient presents a danger of violence to another. 
Similarly, according to Goodman (1985), Tarasoff II was the 
vehicle through which the California Supreme Court dra•atically 
•odified its earlier opinion. Instead of imposing an absolute duty 
to warn, the court in 1976 for•ulated a two-step analysis. The 
first step was whether the therapist, through the standards of 
his/her profession, knew or should have known that the patient 
presented a serious danger of violence to another and, secondly, 
whether the therapist used reasonable care to protect the threatened 
victi•. Good•an also highlighted the fact that the court in 1976 
expressed that the duty is •erely contingent on the circu•stances of 
each case (p. 205). 
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Goodman says that in both Tarasoff I and Tarasoff II, the 
defense argued that the decisions in the cases. especially in the 
latter, were unjust in placing a burden on the psychotherapist and 
bis/her practice. The strongest argument asserted that 
psychiatrists and those in the •ental health professions could not 
reliably predict potential future violence and dangerousness of 
their clients. 
The alternative assertion by the defense was that unnecessary 
warnings would have a bad effect on patients through deterring them 
from seeking therapy and eroding the therapist-patient relationship. 
(This is similar to Judge Clark's dissent.) The court used a 
balancing test to weigh the public interest in treatment against the 
public interest in safety fro• potential violence. Thus, others 
have asserted that another important exception to the common law 
rule of "no duty" was born by the California Supreme Court. 
According to Prosser (1971), "The problem of duty is as broad 
as the whole of negligence ... and no universal test for it has ever 
been formulated" (cited in Goodllan, p. 207). Goodman relies on 
Lowe's 1975 article "Tarasoff v. Regents of University of 
California: Risk Allocation" to state that the arguments continue 
about what factors should be weighed and who should weigh the•. The 
general rule that developed in common law and that was later 
integrated into the second Restate•ent was that there is no duty to 
control the conduct of another, or to warn those endangered. This 
idea is pre•ised on the com•on law distinction between aff ir•ative 
•isconduct and passive inaction, •isfeasance and nonfeasance. This 
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represents the com•only-accepted principle that so long as a person 
does nothing to interfere with another's interests, the law will not 
require any affir•ative undertaking to protect a stranger. Good•an 
states that the court referred to Winterbottom v. Wright (1842), one 
of the first cases to focus on precluding an infinite amount of 
actions. In Wright, •entioned in Chapter III of this thesis. a 
third party to a sale contract of a defective mail coach and a 
driver of that coach, could not collect da•ages for injury resultant 
of using coach. The govern•ent claiaed that the seller had no duty 
to the third-party driver and to hold otherwise would •ake available 
liability against anyone subsequently and re•otely connected with 
the initial relationship. 
Goodman asserts that in Tarasoff II, Judge Tobriner 
dra•atically •edified both the duty required of the defendants and 
the rationale behind it. The opinion begins with a reference to 
Heaven v. Pender's "fundamental principle" (1883). As stated 
earlier, this general principle was the very first interpretation of 
a duty to protect others. Judge Tobriner indicates, nonetheless, 
that Aaerican courts soon retreated fro• this broad duty toward a 
narrowing of the duty in 1934 with the Restateaent of Torts. From 
that ti•e on, Section 315 has been used on occasion to establish a 
duty to control or to protect third persons, as well as a aeans to 
deny liability. 
Goodllan says in a footnote: "The use of section 315 to i•pose 
a duty to control or protect ... has been criticized because 
explicitly Section 315 does not establish an affir•ative obligation 
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to undertake new actions, but only de•ands ... vigilance that 
already has been undertaken" (p. 209, fn.7). He further explains 
that so•e have argued that as there is no capacity by therapists to 
control outpatients, there should neither be a duty to protect 
potential victi•s in these cases. 
The court, in Tarasoff II, continues to find a "special 
relationship" between the therapists and Poddar and still relies on 
the reasoning in Tarasoff I. In Tarasoff II, affirmative duties of 
a •uch broader nature are established. In using Pender's 
"funda•ental principle" of care to others, the court apparently 
arrives at an affir•ative duty based pri•arily upon the element of 
foreseeability. The second Tarasoff decision left •any questions 
unanswered, one of the •ost i•portant referring to foreseeability. 
Resolution of this was left for definition, restriction, and 
extension in future holdings. 
In his opinion, Murphy (1985), author of "Evolution of the Duty 
of Care: So•e Thoughts," says that the holding in Tarasoff is really 
consistent with Heaven v. Pender. Nonetheless, he says that the 
decision can be criticized because the duty e•anating from Section 
315, and that which has been articulated and developed historically 
in ter•s of control and protection, has a wider scope of operation 
and demands a higher standard of care than that i•posed by the 
general rule requiring the exercise of due care. More i•portantly, 
according to Murphy, Section 315 requires al•ost a fiduciary or 
confidential relationship. Murphy su••arizes by saying that all of 
the relationships in Topic 7 of the Restatement and Section 315 have 
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something in coaaon. Si•ply put, it is the fact that relationships, 
despite tort principles, have historically been defined in terms of 
the duty to protect or control. Using negligence principles, it 
seems that the attach•ent of a duty to exercise reasonable care with 
regard to one standing in a particular relationship is sufficient 
once that relationship entailing the duty is established. 
According to Murphy, the Restate•ent analyzes the duty by 
showing its two divisions. It is to protect, in one class of 
relations, and to control in another. The general require•ent under 
negligence principles is to be prudent or to use reasonable care. 
Under the Restatement, protection or control in itself is the object 
of the duties particularized in Sections 314 through 320 and 
abstracted in Section 315. 
Murphy feels that the phrase "to use reasonable care" is very 
broad. In this way, it is helpful because it is wide and flexible 
enough to encompass a full range of huaan activities. It lacks a 
level of specificity "that would channel one's conceived and 
executory actions into routes previously designated to require the 
exercise of care" (p. 170). For exa•ple, the exercise of reasonable 
care •ay at so•e times go well beyond taking efforts to protect or 
to control. In another case, however, the exercise of reasonable 
care might require less than one or aore of a cluster of acts 
explicable in terms of protection or control. 
Murphy points out that the problem with the words "protect" and 
"control" is that they are two-sided: They come close to suggesting. 
but do not demand, a duty to do acts reasonably connected with the 
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end to be achieved, even if these acts be at one's peril. Murphy 
indicates that analysis of the special relationship •entioned in 
Restate•ent sections 314-320 shows that the group representing "duty 
to protect" are undertakings, circuastances which require •ore than 
reasonable care but something less than absolute liability. An 
exa•ple given is an innkeeper who undertakes to protect guests and 
not just use reasonable care in regard to the latter's safety. 
This obligation is not absolute liability, but it does require 
so•ething •ore than reasonable care. What is required is a kind of 
vigilance "cognate at least with the vigilance that Cardozo spoke of 
in MacPherson v. Buick" (p. 171). But there is an i•portant 
difference for Murphy: The vigilance of the innkeeper is directly 
associated with the nature of the undertaking. He or she 
voluntarily assu•ed the responsibility to be careful for the guest. 
MacPherson is different because the obligation there is imposed by 
the law: it is a further extension of the standard of care. 
Murphy explains that in both groups of relationships, the duty 
is a result of an already existing control or an already existing 
protection. Different than MacPherson which stresses an affir•ative 
obligation to do new and positive acts, the duty herein being 
discussed de•ands only the continuous vigilance that has already 
been undertaken by choice or iaposed with the acquiescence or 
knowledge of the burdened party. 
Tarasoff is a result of the probleas in these contradictory 
ideas of duty found in Section 315. Murphy explains that initially, 
in Tarasoff I, the California Supre•e Court held that when a 
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psychotherapist deter•ines or ought to deter•ine that a warning to 
another is necessary to avert danger from his/her patient, he or she 
incurs a legal obligation to give that warning. The court found 
that the relationship itself i•posed a duty to warn. Apparently, 
the court derived this duty to warn fro• both the special 
relationship of Section 315 and the fundamental principle of 
Rowland. As a result of this rule, the psychotherapist was now 
obligated to warn almost at his or her peril. The only consolation 
for the psychotherapist was that the duty was siaply to warn and not 
to carry out any other numerous, thoughtful actions. Murphy says 
that in following Section 315 to its logical conclusion, the court 
implicitly de•onstrated its inapplicability. 
Murphy further explains that Tarasoff II, decided two years 
later, vacated the earlier opinion. The court still confessed to 
use the "special relationship" and "the fundamental principle" 
analysis, but now reasoned that the discharge of the duty required 
the psychotherapist to take one or ao~e various steps depending on 
the nature of the situation. The duty was one of reasonable care. 
Murphy says that the court had aade a reaarkable, though 
unexpressed, shift. Duty of the psychotherapist was now put 
seeaingly where it belonged, in the funda•ental principle and its 
precedents. 
Murphy wishes to show the irony of bringing Section 315 of the 
Restateaent to the forefront and •a.king it one of the aore active 
areas of tort law. In this way, Tarasoff foreshadows the failure of 
the special relationship analysis, "or at the very least portends 
53 
for it a contraction into its for•er, narrow boundaries" (p. 173). 
Because of Tarasoff II, Murphy says that other courts have begun to 
discover the discrepancies in Section 315. 
The result of the Tarasoff cases, according to Murphy, is that 
courts relying on Section 315 May be reluctant, or even unable, to 
i•pose liability in newly eaerging and socially sensitive fact 
situations. There are three reasons: 1) Section 315 requires the 
equivalent of a fiduciary relationship, 2) When courts choose to 
impose liability, they •ay find that it results in a loose and ill-
defined standard of care (including a warning or other preconceived 
act) which in any given case •ay either fall short of, or actually 
exceed, a standard of reasonableness, and 3) Finally, courts wishing 
to deny liability will find that the principles eabodied in Section 
315 are a convenient and plausible device. 
Murphy says that a preferable approach in Tarasof f would have 
been Sias' dissent that found a direct relationship between the 
victim and the defendants. That is to say that Si•s would have 
e•ployed the fundaaental principle to find a duty to exercise 
reasonable care without invoking Section 315. 
According to Murphy, the significance of Tarasoff is that it 
see•s to have ''engrafted" the special relationship concept onto the 
funda•ental principle. "The result can only be to retard the final 
establishaent of a concept of duty uni•peded by privity or the 
•isfeasance-nonfeasance dichoto•y" (p. 175). He thinks that new 
duties will develop not fro• the "special relationship'' of Section 
315, but from the larger proposition of Heaven v. Pender. Murphy 
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says that courts are now trying to use the language of Section 315. 
Nonetheless, the language there will not prevent a court fro• using 
a larger principle analysis when nothing in Section 315 works: 
Murphy concludes: 
Although the relations that may give rise to a duty of care are 
infinite in nuaber, the aost that the foreseeability test 
requires is that one exercise reasonable care, a reasonable 
care founded not in the intricacies of privity or the 
aetaphysics of action-inaction variation, but in ethics-that 
people exercise the saae reasonable care towards others that 
they expect others to exercise towards them (p. 178). 
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CHAPTER V 
THE IMPACT OF TARASOFF ON CALIFORNIA 
It is difficult to neatly organize and categorize the cases 
that were later decided in reaction to Tarasoff. As the Tarasoff 
decision beca•e standard law in California, its theory began to be 
applicable to crimes other than murder. Despite its use. courts 
were still unclear, however, as to how to interpret the final 
holding. A 1980 California court even seeaed to drastically narrow 
the therapists' responsibilities in Thoapson v. County of Alaaeda, 
where the court held that duty to warn only exists when there is an 
identifiable victi•. (Thoapson is discussed later in this chapter.) 
Problems were coapounded as Tarasoff decisions spread to other 
states, and state courts subsequently used each other for reference 
to the original ruling. 
Perhaps what is •ost interesting about the Tarasoff history is 
the i•aediate i•pact that these California state decisions had in 
courts throughout the country. Although the subsequent Brady v. 
Hopper case aay have gained •ore publicity for this area of law, it 
nonetheless was only a repercussion of the unique controversies 
initially set forth in Tarasoff. 
Perhaps it is •ost logical to first examine the transforaations 
within the state of California itself. Following Tarasoff, Bellah 
v. Greenson (1977) was one of the first California cases to be 
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decided with regard to Tarasoff. Greenson concerned a psychiatrist 
who did not warn the parents of a deceased patient that their 
daughter had suicidal tendencies. The psychiatrist also failed to 
prevent the daughter fro• aeeting with heroin addicts. The 
California Appellate Court held that the psychiatrist could not be 
held liable and refused to extend the Tarasoff duty to preclude 
self-inflicted harm or even property damage. In regard to the 
allegation of failure to restrain, the court determined that there 
can be no liability absent risk of violent assault. Risk might be 
interpreted as the probability of violence occurring. It could be 
aeasured by the presence or absence of coaaon violence predictors 
such as the articulation of a specific threat and the ability to 
carry it out. 
In his article "Therapist Liability and Patient 
Confidentiality" (1986), Willia• J. Winslade said that the Bellah 
case proved the court's high reeard for confidentiality in cases not 
involving harm to others. He points out that even the Tarasoff 
opinion recognizes the authority of section 5328 of the California 
Welfare and Institutions Code, which requires that the therapeutic 
conversations with psychotherapists be kept confidential. He 
comaents that the Tarasoff opinion is held only in instances not 
governed by statutory confidentiality rules. 
Two years later, in 1979, the California Appellate Court again 
held defendant doctors illllune to liability for death occurring after 
a failure to "confine" a •entally 111 person. In McDowell v. County 
of Alaaeda, the patient was diagnosed as aentally ill and sent by 
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taxi to a hospital. The patient, however. never arrived at the 
hospital and subsequently killed the victi•. The court justified 
its decision by finding the case different than Tarasoff on two 
grounds: First of all, there was no relationship between either the 
defendants and the victi•. nor the patient and the victi•. 
Secondly, there was no foreseeable victim. 
During the following year, 1980, Mavroudis v. Superior Court 
for County of San Mateo reiterated the basic Tarasoff holding 
together with an indication of the type of danger that aust be 
disclosed to the identifiable victim. Mavroudis concerned 
allegations brought against a hospital by parents who had been 
attacked by their son, a aental patient in the hospital. The 
parents wanted the son's psychiatric records released. Much 
criticis• has been •ade of this case due to the court's choice for 
the private review of the records to deteraine whether the therapist 
knew or should have known that the son presented a serious 
propensity for violence. The court wrote that the confidentiality 
owed to a psychiatric patient should not be broken unless the 
disclosure would preclude leaving others in peril. What is to be 
considered is the probability of violence. Winslade explains that 
this case shows the struggle between judicial interpretation (of 
cases such as Tarasoff) requesting a duty to warn and statutory law 
(such as Section 5328 of the California Welfare Code) which 
prohibits disclosure of therapeutic information. The exception to 
disclosure only in the event of possible danger to another is the 
co .. on ground in trying to satisfy both requireaents until, as 
• 
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Winslade suggests, the courts or legislatures •ove to •ake either 
superseding in authority. 
Winslade uses this case to •ake hypotheses about future 
conflicts between Tarasoff and Section 5328. He says: 
In its 1980 decision in Mavroudis v. Superior Court, a 
California Court of Appeals recognized that Section 5328 does 
not per•it disclosure of confidential records. It did ad•it, 
however, an exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege 
in the presence of conditions evoking the Tarasoff duty-under 
Evidence Code Section 1024 .... On that basis, the Mavroudis 
court ruled that psychiatric records could be obtained by 
parties to a suit, in pretrial discovery if the judge exaained 
the records in chambers and found that the conditions described 
in Evidence Code Section 1024 were present and that there was a 
readily identifiable victi• before the ti•e of the incident" 
(pp. 211-212). 
Winslade explained that the actual iaplications of Mavroudis 
•ight not be readily apparent to therapists and lawyers alike. He 
said that the court's opinion suggests that a party will be allowed 
to bring suit against an institution covered by Section 5328 for 
negligence of the Tarasoff duty and that institutions thought to be 
protected by Section 5328 •ay not, in fact, be shielded by those 
statutes. Winslade purports two additional ramifications due to 
Mavroudis: 1) Confidentiality is probably not protected by 
different statutes, similar to California's Section 5328 in a 
Tarasoff situation. 2) Confidentiality and privacy are further 
•itigated by the judge's private, pretrial examination of the 
therapists' records and the possible release of those records to 
litigants. 
Winslade suggests that only selected, on point portions of the 
records should be •ade available to the court. He says: 
These •atters go beyond the original concern of breaching 
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confidentiality to warn a victi•. Confidentiality •ay now be 
breached to further a lawsuit alleging liability of a therapist 
as opposed to the conduct or potential conduct of the patient 
involved. Jus.t how •uch statutory protection of 
psychotherapist-patient confidentiality still exists in the 
Tarasoff context remains unclear, because the Mavroudis opinion 
addresses this question only insofar as it allows litigants 
pretrial access to privileged infor•ation (p. 212). 
During that sa•e year, Tho•pson v. County of Ala•eda was 
decided by the California Supre•e Court and drastically changed the 
Tarasoff holding. Justice Richardson, writing for the aajority, 
restricted the duty to protect others. The new warning extended 
only to a specific threat to a specific, identifiable victi•. 
Tho•pson concerned a clai• against Ala•eda County for 
negligently releasing a juvenile delinquent who killed the 
plaintiff's son. What is especially important to note in Thompson 
is that the court was dealing with a county having custody over a 
juvenile delinquent and not with a hospital nor therapist. What 
influenced the court's decision were policy considerations 
respecting the hardship that •ight be placed upon the State in 
perforaing parole and probation decisions. The dissent here 
included Justices Tobriner and Mosk who contended that the •ajority 
had •isread the precedent cases which included Tarasoff. Justice 
Tobriner argued that the Tarasoff duty was not liaited to only a 
warning to a specific victi•. He clarified that Tarasoff did not 
aean that failure to warn a victi• who is identifiable is a required 
criterion for a lawsuit. Rather, taking necessary steps •ay or •ay 
not include warning that victia. It aay also include notifying the 
police or those likely to warn the victia theaselves. 
The article entitled "Tarasoff duty to warn discussed in three 
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cases: no such duty found in Maryland" (Mental and Physical 
pisabilities Law Reporter, 1980. Sept./Oct.) refers to Thoapson and 
argues that the decision to release the patient in Tho•pson was 
viewed as a govern.11ental function having illlllunity under California 
Govern•ent Code Sections 820.2 and 845.8. It states that the focal 
point of the controversy in the case was whether the county had a 
duty to warn the local police, neighborhood if released. The court 
looked to Tarasoff and Johnson v. California (1968), and 
subsequently held that the child ultiaately •urdered was not an 
identifiable victi•. In regard to the issuance of general warnings, 
the court said that these would be i•practical and that such warning 
aight undermine the constructive purposes of the parole and 
probation systea by indirectly labeling the released as dangerous to 
society. The article further states that warning the •other-
custodian would not have been worthwhile as she knew of the 
patient's 18-•onth detain•ent. It would not have been conducive to 
release procedures to expect her to have constant supervision. 
Finally, the aother had no special relationship with the defendants. 
The dissent in this case argued that the •other should have 
been warned since the Tarasoff opinion did not eaphasize 
identifiable victi•s. Rather, the essence of the Tarasoff ruling 
was that special relationships, whether these be between a therapist 
and a patient or, in this case, a state and its prisoner, are 
powerful in and of theaselves. The relationship allows the 
therapist or state a unique opportunity to closely observe the 
person whose capacity for violence is questioned. 
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Winslade says: 
Tho•pson speaks to the validity of the state's purposes as they 
are 'rational policies.' A parallel, however, aight be drawn 
between parole as a rationale policy with respect to successful 
cri•inal rehabilitation and confidentiality as a rational 
policy with respect to successful psychotherapy (itself a kind 
of rehabilitation). If the parallel is accurate, then it 
follows that i .. unity should also be granted to those who honor 
confidentiality in the pursuit of successful therapy, even if 
success is not any more guaranteed than it is in cri•inal 
rehabilitation (p. 215). 
About that time, Buford v. California was decided by the 
California Court of Appeals. Here. plaintiff was assaulted and 
raped by patient on leave froa the hospital. The plaintiff argued 
that the state, and its employees, had failed to correctly diagnose 
and treat the patient. The court of appeals held that the state did 
have a special relationship to the patient because priaarily, he was 
still a mental patient in spite of "leave" peraission and secondly, 
he still expected assistance in rehabilitation. The court also 
found that the problem lay not in the discretionary decision •ade by 
the state to give a leave of absence. Discretionary functions are 
those that include a weighing of policy considerations. Winslade 
exeaplifies this arguaent by saying that the develop•ent of 
goverruaent regulations is a discretionary function. Goverruaent 
bodies are protected fro• liability for discretionary functions 
through statutory provisions, such as the California Governaent 
Code, Section 856. Thus, in Buford, the decision to release a 
•ental patient is discretionary because it concerns consideration as 
to whether the public policy, favoring rehabilitation, outweighs 
that of continued detention. The governaental body, then, would be 
protected for its decision to release. 
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"Ministerial" actions, however, are of a different type. These 
are tasks perfor•ed usually by personnel, under direction. according 
to orders, without discretion as to those actions. These are acts 
perfor•ed or omitted by the hospital after the grant of leave was 
per•itted. Winslade points out that the appellate court left to the 
triers of fact, the jury, the question of whether or not the 
therapeutic/rehabilitative personnel at the hospital had correctly 
performed their '•inisterial' duties in releasing Buford into 
society. 
In reference to Tarasoff, Winslade argues that a failure to 
protect a potential victim would be a failure to perfor• a 
•inisterial duty. He presents the demarcations •ade by statutes 
between discretionary decisions and decisions concerning follow-up, 
•inisterial tasks. In Slllmling up, Winslade says: 
Ministerial actions in Buford see• to be co•parable to the 
therapist's position in Tarasoff-type cases, insofar as each is 
liable for actions, or failures to act, to prevent harm. It is 
not clear fro• the discussions whether the court is concerned 
with actual distinctions between •inisterial and discretionary 
functions or whether it is trying to deter•ine differing 
standards that would constitute negligence in the two for•s 
(pp. 216-217). 
He notes that cases like Thoapson and Buford suggest that 
liability is dependent upon decisions co•patible with professional 
standards and in response to so•e rational state policy, rather than 
with the presence/absence of an identifiable victi•. Finally, he 
purports that auch i .. unity •akes wealthy institutions •ore 
attractive as defendant• than private practitioners. 
During the following year, Me2eff v. Doland brought under 
scrutiny the issue concerning the therapist's duty to control 
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patients, either hospitali~ed or outpatients. In Megeff, the 
plaintiffs were the wife and daughter of an 87-year-old •an who 
attacked the• upon his release fro• a hospital. This •an had 
demonstrated aggressive behavior while hospitalized for a cardiac 
condition. The plaintiffs alleged that the hospital did not 
adequately exercise sufficient control over a violent person and 
used Tarasoff and Section 319 of Restateaent (Second) of Torts to 
construct a duty to control. The court, however, did not find a 
duty to control based on absence of defendant's ability to do so. 
Consequently, the ability of a psychotherapist to control either a 
voluntary outpatient or a voluntary inpatient would bring into light 
the issue of the duty of the therapist to control such a patient by 
any aeans other than involuntary co••itment. 
In the next year, the District Court of California, Central 
Division heard Doyle v. U.S.A. (1982). This was an action for the 
wrongful death of a college security guard. It was brought under 
the Federal Tort Claias Act and was based on negligence of an Aray 
psychiatrist who discharged a 19-year-old serviceaan n8.Jlled Carson. 
Two days after release, the serviceaan killed a security guard. 
This case concerned a conflict of laws between the states of 
California and Louisiana. Louisiana law was held applicable. Under 
the law of this state, the ar•y psychiatrists did not have to warn 
the college guard killed by the serviceaan of the serviceaan's 
ho•icidal intent in that the service•an never told his psychiatrist 
nor any counselor who interviewed hi• of his intention to kill the 
security guard who patrolled a nearby caapus. Additionally, the 
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court sur•ised that even if California law could be used in this 
case. there would be no duty to warn of serviceaan's homicidal 
intent because there was no foreseeable victi•. The court cited 
California's McDowell v. County of Alameda (1979) to show that under 
California law, the defendant owed no duty of care to a ae•ber of 
the general public such as Mr. Doyle. 
One year later, in Vu v. Singer (1983), the U.S. Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals followed the earlier and revolutionary ruling of 
Thompson in finding that, under California law, the victi• •ust be 
foreseeable and specifically identifiable in duty to warn and 
control cases. Vu concerned residents being attacked by Job Corps 
•embers working at a neighborhood Job Corps center. In a concurring 
opinion, Judge Rothstein agreed that under California law, Thompson 
•ust be followed, but questioned Thompson's view of foreseeability. 
She 'acknowledged Justice Tobriner's dissent in Tho•pson and further 
co .. ented on the confusion between the existence of a duty of care 
(warn or control) with the question of an identifiable victim. She 
wrote: 
As recognized by Justice Tobriner in Tho•pson, the 
consideration of whether the Vus are 'identifiable victias' is 
relevant not to the existence of a duty of care. but only to 
the question whether a warning to the Vus •ight have been a 
reasonable •eans to discharge that duty .... The application of 
such a requireaent here to a duty of control follows logically 
fro• Thoapson, but nonetheless co•pounds the Tho•pson's court's 
error in reasoning because it per•its a '•eans' consideration 
to dictate the existence of a duty of care (p. 1032). 
What Judge Rothstein see•s to be saying is that the ability to 
•ake a warning to identifiable victi•s does not constitute the duty 
to warn, but re•ains only a •easure•ent as to whether the duty, the 
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existence of which is established separately, has been reasonably 
aet. In short, recognition of the ability to warn does not signify 
that there is an actual duty to warn in the particular circumstance. 
During that same year, Jablonski v. United States was decided 
by the United States Ninth Circuit Court who again relied on the 
issue of the Tarasoff duty to warn. The defendants were Veterans 
Ad•inistration psychiatrists who were found negligent for their 
failure to record and transmit inforaation, for failure to obtain 
past medical records indicating that the patient was likely to 
direct his violence against the victi•. and for failure to warn the 
victi•. (Winslade co••ented that there was recklessness, in 
addition to negligence.) 
Jablonski concerned a case in which the dangerous patient 
underwent psychiatric examination after atte•pting to rape his 
lover's mother. The V.A. psychiatrist concluded through his 
diagnosis that Jablonski had antisocial characteristics and a 
tendency to be dangerous. He was not committed and refused 
voluntary hospitalization despite his past filled with violence at 
other Veterans Administration facilities. The psychiatrists advised 
the patient's girlfriend to leave Jablonski. She eventually 
complied. Upon visiting him at their for•er apart•ent, however, she 
was killed by him. The court held that if the psychiatrists had 
appropriate relevant inforaation, then violence against the victim 
would have been foreseeable. The court felt that the facts of the 
case fit so•ewhere between Tarasoff and Thompson in having an 
unidentified but potentially ascertainable victia. 
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Finally, in the sa•e year, 1983, the California Supre•e Court 
aade a substantial aodification of the Thoapson decision to Hedlund 
v. Superior Court of Orange County. This was the first aajor 
decision affecting the duty to warn since the severe "identifiable 
victi•" test of Thoapson. Here, the Supreae Court deterained that a 
therapist who is negligent in aeeting his/her duty to warn an 
identifiable potential victia that another has threatened violence 
aay be responsible not only to the person threatened but also to 
third parties who aay be haraed if the threat •ateriali2es. 
In this case. the plaintiff was the victim's four-year-old son 
who sat next to his •other in their car when she was shot by the 
patient of the two defendant psychologists. The suit here was only 
for eaotional da•ages, not physical hara to the son. The court 
showed that it would recognize a duty in future cases not only to 
children, but also to others in close relationships to the 
threatened victia and even to soae bystanders. Consequently, in 
California, the duty to warn has been extended to foreseeable 
persons in a close relationship to the specifically-threatened 
victia. It is interesting to note that Thoapson, which holds to the 
contrary, is not aentioned in the Hedlund opinion. Because of this, 
the extent to which new decisions are binding is questionable. At 
least in the case of Hedlund, the court was not concerned in 
changing or building upon precedent in order to further a resolution 
of the legal dileaaa in Tarasotf. 
Beck (1985) says of Hedlund that the California court found 
that negligent failure to ascertain dangerousness in a Tarasoff case 
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is as much grounds for liability as is the negligent failure to warn 
victi•s after the deter•ination has been aade. He clarifies that 
where there is a negligent failure to warn, the duty •BY be owed to 
any who are foreseeably threatened. 
The dissent in Hedlund argued that the •ajority opinion 
furthers the incorrect belief that psychiatrists and psychologists 
have extraordinary perception and are able to predict violence 
better than others. Dissenters argued for si•ple negligence, not 
•alpractice toward defendants. because the failure to warn happened 
after knowledge or treataent. Beck says that this is an incorrect 
view because a professional, not a civil, judgaent is used. He adds 
that aany different standard have been used to evaluate 
dangerousness and that this iaplies that there really is no factual 
basis for diagnosing it. Beck says that i•posing potential 
liability on therapists creates an injustice for therapists by 
holding the• responsible for injuries to people other than the 
victi•. 
In 1984, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled on an 
action brought against the United States under the Federal Tort 
Claias Act for the wrongful death of a sect aeaber. in Grunnet v. 
United States (1984), the U.S. District Court had dismissed the 
action, and the plaintiff, decedent's •other, appealed. The court 
of appeals held that the U.S. was iaaune fro• suit under the Act's 
foreign country and discretionary exceptions. This was an incident 
related to the Jonestown tragedy where the failure to warn the 
victim occurred in Guyana and is an exception to the jurisdiction of 
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the FTCA. However, the other failures to warn others (relatives) of 
the danger that the People's Temple posed, happened within the 
United States. In order to make a negligence suit in the United 
States, Grunnet would have had to have shown that the U.S., as a 
private person, breached a duty owed to her. Since the failure to 
warn Grunnet happened in California, California law would apply. 
Because there was no special relationship here, the judgaent was 
affiraed. 
In 1985, a bill to reduce therapist responsibility was 
introduced in the California Legislature by the California 
Psychological Association. It was explained in the Nove•ber 1985 
issue of the APA Monitor (p. 24). The author said that the 
Association had been successful in its support of a proposal that 
exe•pted psychotherapists from liability for failure to warn and 
protect "except where the patient has couunicated to the 
psychotherapist a serious threat of violence against a reasonably 
identifiable victim" (p. 24). 
Although the bill passed both legislative houses, Governor 
George Deukmejian did not sign it because he feared that liaiting 
the duty would present more danger to the public (Mental and 
Physical Disabilities Law Reporter, 1985, p. 77). It was said in 
the article that the •ajor adversaries to the bill were state trial 
lawyer associations because lawyers see therapists as the "bad guys" 
(p. 24), and seek to collect in lawsuits against therapists. 
Rogers Wright, past president of the state association, 
appeared in the •edia as a representative for psychology. He said: 
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"Self-proclaiaed experts who aake public predictions about what 
people will do in the future, or speculate about what the soaeone 
was thinking at soae point in the past, have led the public to 
believe that psychologists can predict dangerousness" (p. 24). 
Wright ad•itted that the bill does not represent "a good law, but 
the best under the circu•stances." He added that such advances "may 
allow us to practice until the aadness passes, until it's realized 
that we're not godlike but siaply people involved with other people 
in a learning process called psychotherapy" (p. 24). 
As a result of Tarasoff, aany studies were conducted to assess 
the impact of its second decision. As early as May 2. 1977, an 
article entitled "A Growing Proble• for Researchers: Protecting 
Privacy," by Cheryl Fields appeared in The Chronicle of Higher 
Education (cited in Behavior Today, May 16, 1977, p. 1). Her work 
describes a study of the issues of confidentiality in research work 
pursued by Professor Jaaes D. Carroll of Syracuse University. 
Carroll learned through his study that soae legal iaaunity is 
crucial to protect behavioral researchers fro• having their 
docu•ents subpoenaed by the govern•ent. Carroll testified before 
the Congressional Privacy Protection Study co .. ission which is 
constituted for facilitation of changes in the federal Privacy Act 
of 1974. Carroll presented the following findings: 1) More than 7% 
of the respondents (behavioral researchers) spoke of a proble• of 
confidentiality in their research. 2) In the above 7%, subpoenas 
were issued in 17 of the cases. In 26 other cases, "substantial 
government deaands (were) aade upon researchers through judicial, 
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legislative, and adainistrative bodies" (p. 2). 3) Twenty of the 47 
incidents concerning important problems of confidentiality involved 
research possibly leading to "an iaaediate public-policy issue" 
which was not further clarified in the article (p. 2). 
Siailarly, the Match 1979 issue of Behavior Today describes an 
article by San Francisco attorney Toni Pryor Wise, who has shown 
that "nine out of ten California psychotherapists have significantly 
aodified their practices as a result of the decision-and in 
decisions that aay be less than optiaal for their patients" (p. 1). 
Wise herself states in the described Stanford Law Review article 
that the aost draaatic change in California is the "heightened 
anxiety aany therapists now feel in any clinical situations in which 
the potential violence of a patient becoaes an issue or in which the 
prospect of a duty to warn arises" (cited in Behavior Today, March 
1979, p. 1). Wise reported that as aany as a sixth of all the 
psychologists who answered her survey noted that they wished to 
avoid exploring areas as potential hoaicidal iapulses in their work 
with patients. Many respondents said that they now turned down 
clients who seeaed prone to violence. Soae psychotherapists told 
Wise that they were now aore willing to coamit a patient who seemed 
dangerous to a third party. 
Wise argues that the treataent of aental health problems aay be 
weakened by therapists' uneasiness. She said that about 25~ of the 
patients were cautious in discussing violent tendencies when they 
discovered that their therapist aight breach their confidences. She 
also pointed out that Tarasoff aay have exacerbated an already 
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prevalent willingness to overpredict dangerousness. Wise found 
proof that warnings to f81lily ae•bers, police, and potential victias 
had been coaaon practice aaong California therapists even before 
Tarasoff. In fact. she reported that alaost one-half of her 
respondents adaitted that they had given these kind of warnings, 
often to aore than one individual during a single occurrence. 
Wise thinks that her study has revealed "that iaposing on the 
therapists a legal duty to warn, as opposed to the traditionally 
discretionary professional duty, has had potentially detriaental 
effects on psychotherapy" (pp. l-2). She coaments that "courts and 
legislatures aust decide if the uncertain increase in public safety 
due to Tarasoff outweighs such potentially serious detriments to the 
practice of psychotherapy" (p. 2). 
According to Behavior Today, Wise's survey included state-
licensed psychologists and aeabers of the California Psychiatric 
Association. Response rates were 34% and 35% respectively. Also, 
88% of her respondents reported soae clinical effects as a result of 
Tarasoff. 
Givelber. Bowers, and Blitch ("The Tarasoff Controversy: A 
Suaaary of Findings Proa an Bapirical Study of Legal, Ethical, and 
Clinical Issues," 1985) describe a study done on psychotherapists 
post-Tarasoff. Their article is coaprised of a nuaber of conclusory 
stateaents with ensuing explanations. An effort here is made to 
suaaarize the aain findings concisely for the purposes of this 
thesis. 
Perhaps their stateaents can be reorganized into three groups, 
72 
each representing a unique conclusion: (a) the identification of 
the case, (b) the effect on therapists' practices, and (c) the 
relevant discrepancies between California practitioners and those 
fro• out of the state. Jn the first category, researchers found 
that the Tarasoff case is well-known and understood as applicable 
when either therapists assess a patient as potentially violent or, 
as reasonable therapists, believe that they should have arrived at a 
positive prediction of dangerousness in a given case. On the other 
hand, •ost therapists (75%) •istakenly believe that Tarasoff 's real 
thrust is a duty to warn likely victi•s, rather than a 
responsibility to exercise reasonable care. Most of the 
practitioners believe themselves to be at least ethically bound to 
follow the Tarasoff decision. 
Jn terms of the second category, therapists have not readily 
adopted a defense of being incapable of predicting dangerousness. 
The study shows that over 75% of those surveyed believed that they 
could •ake at least a "probable" prediction as to the dangerousness 
of an individual. Only 5% see•ed to think that such a prediction 
was i•possible. 
The study revealed that a variety of •ental health 
practitioners rely on the sa•e criteria for predicting 
dangerousness. These include: violent histories, hostile behavior, 
abnor•al cognitive or e•otional states, stressful environ•ents and 
psychotic diagnoses. Despite this recognition of violent behavior, 
therapists atill are not likely to warn a victi•. This will occur 
in only about 15~ of all cases, and it •ay be connected to specific 
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verbal threats identifying the victia. In any case, the authors 
state that warning a victim is almost always accoapanied by some 
other action by the therapist. For exaaple, in addition to the 
warning, treatment and documentation transpire in 80% of the cases. 
In alaost three-fourths of these cases, the therapist atteapted to 
alert someone other than the victi•. such as a friend or family. 
The article stated that two possible reasons for this kind of action 
is the disclosure by patient of intended victim or just the aere 
likelihood that an unnaaed, potential victi• is known well by the 
patient. 
There were soae notable differences revealed between California 
psychotherapists and therapists fro• other states. In teras of 
knowledge of the case, al•ost every Californian psychiatrist (96%) 
and the aajority of Californian psychologists and social workers 
(90%) had heard of the Tarasoff decision or so•ething resembling it. 
Outside of California, 87% of psychiatrists bad heard of the case by 
na•e and 7% of soaetbing like it. Siailarly, al•ost 75% of out-of-
state psychologists and aore than half of non-Californian social 
workers knew soaething about it. 
Also. in assessing the duty, Californians are 70% aore apt to 
think that warning alone satisfies a Tarasoff duty. Psychiatrists 
outside of California are 10% aore likely than their fellow 
psychologists and social workers to believe the same. Thus, 
psychiatrists in general are aore likely to aisinterpret the 
holding. 
Finally, Californians are •ore likely to react to a verbal 
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threat with a warning to potential victi•s than are therapists fro• 
out of the state. The study reveals that each group of •ental 
health professionals in California is •ore likely to warn those in 
other states. For exa.11ple, California psychiatrists are 11% •ore 
likely to warn, psychologists are 5% •ore likely to warn, and social 
workers are 20% •ore likely to warn. 
California's response to Tarasoff stirred controversy in the 
courts and caused California therapists to be •ore aware of their 
liabilities. From its inception, the Tarasoff decision was 
confusing. The rehearing to clarify its ramifications only confused 
the APA further. Nonetheless, perhaps the atteapt to redefine the 
duty was a necessary step in exploring, for the first ti•e, the 
legal para•eters of •ental health practitioners' legal 
responsibilities. The fact that the courts were inexperienced in 
ruling on this subject is evidenced in the varying holdings within 
the state itself, especially in the discrepancy between the Tho•pson 
and Hedlund opinions. Nonetheless, it •ay be reassuring that the 
surveys done showed a •ajority of therapists within the state aware 
of the decision and considering the effect on their own work. It 
seems impossible that the courts could for•ulate a proper holding on 
the duty to warn using only legal theories. The furor over the 
Tarasoff decision caused therapists, and counsel for therapists, to 
examine the duty fro• a therapeutic standpoint. Perhaps it was 
California's intensity, including its courts' confusion, that was 
needed for perpetuating a national focus on this aspect of •ental 
health and law. 
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CHAPTER VI 
FEDERAL AND STATE CASES FURTHERING TARASOFF 
As evidenced in these studies. there is great dispersion of the 
Tarasoff decision throughout the country. Many scholars and legal 
researchers have atteapted to exaaine the effects in case law among 
the states. What follows are the •ost well-known ra•ifications of 
the Tarasoff decision and its progeny outside of California during 
the ten years following Tarasoff. As would be predicted, state 
courts differ with each other and federal courts often look to the 
law of the state courts involved in their suits for so•e direction. 
For purposes of organization only, both state and federal decisions 
throughout the country will be grouped according to the judicial 
districts aeant for federal courts of appeal. For the purposes of 
this thesis, e•phasis is on the federal decisions considering the 
duty to warn. However, in federal circuits having no relevant 
federal case, state cases will be supple•ented in order to add to 
the understanding of that geographical area's disposition on the 
issue. 
Lipari v. Sears Roebuck and Co. (1980) is herein discussed by 
itself as other courts refer to it in •aking their decision. 
Lipari was a Nebraska suit filed in the eighth Judicial Circuit 
in 1980. It concerned a •ental patient under outpatient treataent 
at a Veterans Adainistration hospital. He purchased a gun froa 
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Sears which he later used to fire into a crowded roo• at a 
nightclub. The plaintiffs sustained that the VA therapists knew or 
should have known that the patient was dangerous to hi•self and 
others. Consequently, the plaintiffs purported that therapists had 
a duty to detain or involuntarily co••it hi•. The identity of the 
victi•s was re•ote, but the court refused to li•it the therapists' 
liability only to identifiable victims, thus expanding the li•iting 
requirements of identifiability of the Tho•pson decision. Lipari's 
influence will be •entioned in cases that follow. 
Proceeding in a chronological order, then, reference is first 
made to those cases in the first judicial circuit. The states in 
this circuit are Maine, Massachusetts, New Hallpshire. and Rhode 
Island. In 1982, the Massachusetts Supre•e Court decided 
Commonwealth v. Prendergast. The court here discussed Tarasoff 
during this •urder case. where the defendant had pleaded insanity to 
killing his girlfriend. In a footnote referring to Tarasoff, the 
court said that it was unfortunate that the patient had not 
co .. itted himself involuntarily or that potential victi•s were not 
warned, in light of the fact that the patient's records revealed 
that he was potentially dangerous. Inference is •ade of the real 
necessity so•eti•es in leaning in the direction of warning an 
individual, rather than •aintaining the privileee statutes. 
Three years later, in 1985, Gil•ore v. Buckley was filed in the 
Massachusetts division of the federal district court. The plaintiff 
appealed and the court of appeals for this circuit heard the case in 
1986. The case concerned an adainistration of the estate of a·wo•an 
77 
who was •urdered by an in•ate on furlough. The administrator 
brought a civil rights action against the county, the sheriff, the 
county commissioners, the superintendent of the jail. the state 
hospital's •edical director. and the state hospital's psychiatrists. 
Justice Ca•pbell said that the failure of the state psychiatrists 
and other county e•ployees to protect the victia fro• a •urderous 
attack was not actionable under the Civil Rights claim of Section 
1983. Also, even though the i1111ate was legally in state custody on 
furlough, he was in no relationship with the county co••issioners. 
The coamissioners were not involved in individual furlough cases. 
nor did they know of Prendergast's furlough application. Judgment 
was affirmed for defendants. 
The second judicial circuit is coaprised of Connecticut, New 
York, and Vermont. The noteworthy case in this area, and one 
si•ilar to that •entioned above is Jane Doe v. United Social and 
Mental Health heard in the Connecticut division in 1987. This case 
concerned the ad•inistrator of an estate of a wo•an whom parolee had 
•urdered shortly after his parole fro• jail. The inmate had been 
incarcerated for atte•pted bank robbery during which he shot a 
female teller. The administrator brought a civil rights action 
against •e•ber of parole board and various parole officers. In 
connection with this release, a wo•an was sexually assaulted by this 
sa•e parolee and brought civil rights actions and co••on law 
negligence actions against the same and additional defendants. The 
defendants •oved for sua•ary judg11ent, asserting, a•ong other 
argllllents, that the parole officers did not assuae any special 
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relationship toward either the woaan killed nor the one assaulted by 
parolee. The aotion was granted due to the court's reasoning that 
past Connecticut cases did not require the kind of foreseeability 
deaonstrated in Tarasoff and Tho•pson. Looking to Buckley, the 
court said that indication of a relationship between the inaate and 
the deceased was even weaker here. There was no demonstration that 
the defendants could be charged with awareness of inaate's 
dangerousness at the tiae of parole. Even if such dangerousness 
could be assumed, there was no evidence of a special danger for 
deceased. In regard to the woman assaulted, the court failed to 
find a special relationship. The court was careful to point out 
that the Connecticut statute governing parole of inmates does not 
set out an affir•ative duty for defendants to protect a specific, 
defined class of citizens containing either of the plaintiffs. 
The third judicial circuit contains Delaware, New Jersey, and 
Pennsylvania. Here, there seems to be general consensus that 
Tarasoff is good law. For example, the New Jersey courts not only 
adopted, but broadened Tarasoff in Mcintosh v. Milano (1979). The 
facts of Mcintosh were a little different than Tarasoff, pri•arily 
because the patient never directly threatened the victim who was 
killed by psychiatric patient. Plaintiffs sustained that the 
defendant, having the relevant inforaation at hand, should have 
known that his patient posed a threat and should have warned the 
victi• or police. The court held that the defendant psychiatrists 
had a duty to protect a potential victi• by whatever steps were 
reasonably necessary, and based this duty upon either the 
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relationship giving rise to the obligation of Tarasoff or upon the 
broader requirement of a physician to protect the welfare of his 
community. 
A U.S. District Court in Pennsylvania seeaed to accept the 
Tarasoff theory, but could not extend the theory to extend the facts 
of the case. In Leedy v. Hartnett (1981), the court held that the 
Veterans Administration owed no duty to two people who were beaten 
by an alcoholic veteran recently discharged from a Veterans 
Administration hospital. Although the veteran was staying in the 
hoae of the victias, they were not foreseeable victims. The court 
specifically declined to follow Lipari, and granted sua•ary judgment 
for the hospital. 
During that same year, Hopewell v. Adibempe (1981) was decided 
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. 
This case presents a different problem as the plaintiff here is the 
psychiatrist's patient suing a community health center after a 
warning was •ade as to her behavior. The court did recognize 
Tarasoff and its accoapanying duty to warn. Nonetheless, it found 
that the duty did not arise from the circuastances at hand and that 
the state confidentiality statute was superior to psychiatrist's 
defense of an obligation to warn plaintiff's e•ployer. The court 
found the defendant liable but did not foraulate an amount for 
damages. 
In Miller v. U.S.A. (1983), a suit filed in the District Court 
for the Eastern Division of Pennsylvania, the court concluded that 
the Pennsylvania Supreae Court would i•pose a duty on a Pennsylvania 
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•unicipality to protect a police infor•ant with who• it has 
established a special relationship. Allong the reasons were policy 
considerations and reciprocal cooperation between police and 
citizens. The court also considered sections 314 and 315 of the 
Restate•ent and the Tarasoff decision. 
The fourth judicial circuit contains Maryland, North Carolina. 
South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia. Within the fourth 
district, Hasanei v. United States (1982) can be cited as further 
co••ent on Pennsylvania law. Here, the Federal District Court of 
Maryland, applying Pennsylvania law, failed to find a right or duty 
of psychiatrists to predict the actions of a VA outpatient who, by 
driving negligently, haraed the plaintiff in a car accident. The 
court co••ented that the ordinary relationship between a 
psychiatrist and a voluntary outpatient lacked the capacity of 
control needed. The court did qualify its response, however, by 
saying that reasonable actions should be taken where there is a 
specific threat to a specific person. 
In ter•s of Maryland state law itself, the Maryland Court of 
Appeals refused to either accept or reject the Tarasoff decision as 
of 1983. In Shaw v. Glickman (1983), the plaintiff and a separating 
couple had all been patients of the same psychiatric teaa. Dr. Shaw 
was injured by the husband when the husband found Dr. Shaw in bed 
with the wife. Dr. Shaw sued the tea• for negligently failing to 
warn hi• that one of their patients, the husband, was violent and 
unstable and presented a danger to hi•. The trial court granted 
suaaary judgment for the psychiatric tea• on the grounds that Dr. 
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Shaw voluntarily placed hi•self within a dangerous plan by beco•ing 
the wife's lover. Although Dr. Shaw appealed, the appeals court 
here found that Tarasoff did not apply in this case, because the 
husband had not threatened now shown any aniaosity toward the 
plaintiff. Neither did the husband's carrying of a gun iaply danger 
to Dr. Shaw. The court noted that the therapists had a duty founded 
in The Hippocratic Oath and in statutory law to preserve 
confidentiality. 
In Purr v. Spring Grove State Hospital (1983), the Maryland 
Appeals Court heard a case about a patient who had a history of 
collllitting unnatural sexual acts on boys. He had undergone a 
forensic evaluation and voluntarily co••itted hi•self to the 
hospital as part of a plea bargain in a criminal case. After a 
sporadic pattern of leaving and returning to the hospital, he 
collllitted brutal acts on an 11-year-old boy and aurdered hia. In 
looking to Thoapson, the court found that the doctors had no duty to 
warn because there was no foreseeable victi•. Swamary judgment was 
granted to defendants. 
During the following year, 1986, two cases were heard by the 
federal courts in this circuit. In the southern district of West 
Virginia, Davis v. Monsanto concerned an employee who brought an 
action against the eaployer/defendant by alleging tortious invasion 
of privacy and breach of contract, in connection with the eaployer's 
disclosures of inforaation that the eaployee gave to the aental 
health professional concerning eaployee's potential for 
dangerousness. The court said that there was a difference between 
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publication that is required for others' safety and disclosure which 
constitutes invasion of privacy. According to the court, an action 
for invasion of privacy de•ands a high level of publicity. The 
court said that it was not a violation of privacy to share a private 
fact with another individual or even a s•all group. Additionally, 
the court said that publication of private aatters is entirely 
privileged if required by law. The court then very briefly 
summarized the Tarasoff decision. The court noted that the failure 
of one in a special relationship with a aentally disturbed person to 
protect others from the danger of that •entally disturbed person 
would be subject to damages. Therefore, the therapist here acted 
correctly, and suaaary judgment is granted for defendant. 
The second case during that year was Thigpen v. U.S. (1986) 
heard in the court of appeals for this circuit. Thigpen concerned 
an action brought under the Tort Claims Act which sought da•ages on 
behalf of •inors who were sexually molested by naval hospital 
eaployees. The governaent aoved to dismiss. Judge Hawkins of the 
District Court for the District of South Carolina granted the 
governaent's aotion and the ainors appealed. Judgaent was affiraed. 
Circuit Court Judge Murnaghan, who reluctantly concurred in the 
decision, stated that a Federal Torts Claia here could not find for 
the plaintiffs due to a technical reading of the Act, but eaphasized 
that there was, in fact, a special relationship here between the 
hospital and the patients/plaintiffs who were injured: "Hospital 
patients stand in particular need of protection froa the institution 
responsible for their care. Weakened by disease or by ... surgery, 
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they are peculiarly unable to protect the•selves. They are ... 
psychologically unprepared to •eet a physical attack ... " (p. 402). 
During the following year, Currie v. U.S.A. (1987), was heard 
in the court of appeals for this circuit. The case concerned a 
wrongful death action that was brought against the U.S. for failure 
of psychiatrists at Durhaa, North Carolina VA hospital to 
involuntarily co••it a patient who shot the plaintiff's decedent. 
Plaintiff is the administratrix of the estate. The U.S. District 
Court for the Middle District of North Carolina granted the U.S. a 
aotion for summary judgment and the plaintiff appealed. Although 
the plaintiffs tried to analogize the case to Tarasoff, the court 
held that there was an iaportant differentiation between the duty to 
control and the duty to warn. The for•er aay infringe upon the 
patient's constitutional interests while the latter is but "an 
expression of huaanitarianis• and the spirit of the good Sa•aritan" 
(p. 213). This seems to imply that the duty to warn. as held here, 
is a voluntary duty based •ore on ethical principles than legal 
obligations. The court also aentions Lipari v. Sears (1980) to say 
that a special relationship between psychiatrist and patient !•ports 
a duty to that patient, but it is uncertain whether or not a duty 
can run to third parties. 
The fifth circuit contains Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. 
Here, •ention should be •ade of Doyle v. United States (1982) which 
was decided in a U.S. District Court of California, but which 
nonetheless coa•ented on Louisiana law. The United States District 
Court of California !•plied that the Tarasoff reasoning would not be 
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accepted in Louisiana. Without exact reference to Tarasoff, the 
court nonetheless said that from a general standpoint. the Louisiana 
courts have appeared reluctant to allow liability in cases where 
there has been a failure to protect the public fro• a dangerous 
individual. 
Similarly, in 1987, Willis v. U.S.A. was decided in the Western 
District of Louisiana, Alexandria Division. This was an action 
where persons injured in an autoaobile accident, allegedly caused by 
a recently discharged Veterans Adainistration hospital patient, 
brought suit under the Federal Tort Claias Act. The district court 
looked to Louisiana law to decide that the hospital was not liable 
in absence of aedical evidence indicating that the patient was 
potentially dangerous at tiae of release and in light of the 
reasonable care that had been exercised by the hospital in regard to 
release procedures. 
In the sixth district, the federal court initially co .. ented on 
Ohio law in Case v. United States (1981). The court declared, "The 
parties agree that this aatter will be controlled by the law of 
Ohio. Therefore, while instructive, the citations of authority to 
Tarasoff and Lipari are not controlling" (p. 318). In a footnote, 
the court further states, "Tarasoff stands alaost alone in its 
holding" (p. 318). This case concerned an executrix who wanted 
daaages fro• the United States according to the Federal Tort Claias 
Act. The plaintiff asserted that the govermaent was responsible for 
the death of the victia who was aurdered by a psychiatric outpatient 
of a Veterans Adainistration hospital. Because the patient had in 
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recent years "i•proved" (not specified in opinion), had been a 
working citizen and had been a productive •e•ber of society, he was 
dee•ed not to be dangerous to hi•self or others prior to the 
occurrence. Using Ohio law, the court said that the doctors were 
not subject to liability if they acted reasonably in releasing the 
patient fro• state control. Additionally, according to the 
plaintiff's expert, Dr. Nizny, a co .. ent on the patient's condition 
•ade to patient's family or friends, without agree•ent as to this, 
would be breach of care. The co•plaint was dis•issed. 
In 1983, the Michigan Supre•e Court decided Davis v. Dr. Yong-
Oh Lhi•. whereby they adopted the reasoning of Tarasoff and 
Tho•pson. In Davis, the defendant, a state hospital psychiatrist 
dis•issed a patient who killed his •other two •onths later. Relying 
on Tarasoff, the appellate court held that the psychiatrist 
recognized only a duty to readily-identifiable victi•s and not to 
the public at large. 
In Chrite v. United States (1983), the federal court of the 
Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division looked to Davis to 
•ake the hypothesis that the Michigan Supre•e Court would follow a 
Tarasoff and Tho•pson rationale. The case deter•ined the validity 
of a clai• for daaages allegedly caused by the negligence of a VA 
hospital in releasing a •ental patient who, six aonths later, 
•urdered his aother-in-law. The court concluded that the Michigan 
Supre•e Court would consider holding the defendant responsible for 
failure to warn of the released person's dangerousness. 
In 1986, the District Court for the Eastern District of 
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Michigan, Southern Division decided Soutear v. U.S.A .. This case 
concerned a mental patient's father who brought a wrongful death 
action alleging that •edical personnel at the Allen Hospital in the 
Shelby Township of Michigan, a VA hospital, were negligent in 
releasing a •ental patient and in failing to warn the patient's 
parents that the patient posed danger of physical violence to 
parents. The patient subsequently killed his •other. The court 
looked to the case of Davis v. Lhim (1983) to deter•ine that 
liability would exist here if a standard of care had been breached. 
The VA doctors' belief was that the patient was not dangerous to 
anyone, and that this was an opinion for•ulated within the duty of 
care. There was no duty to warn the parents here because there was 
a scarcity of evidence to i•ply that the patient would be dangerous. 
Moreover, there was enough warning given to the parents, through 
notice and explanation of their son's illness, that the patient 
could beco•e dangerous. 
The seventh circuit contains Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin. 
Although there are no federal cases available for this circuit, 
there are two state decisions. First of all, an Indiana Court of 
Appeals in 1981 cited Tarasoff as an acceptable rationale upon which 
negligence could be established. Estate of Mathes v. Ireland (1981) 
concerned a husband who, individually, and as ad•inistrator of 
wife's estate, brought an action for the wrongful death of his wife. 
The suit included the wife's •urderer, the parents and grandparents 
of the •urderer, and the psychiatric facilities which apparently 
treated the killer. Motions to dis•iss the defendants were granted 
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to all but the killer. The husband appealed, and the Court of 
Appeals of Indiana ruled in part that the husband's coaplaint 
against the psychiatric facilities was valid. The coaplaint stated 
that personnel at centers had charge of the killer and know of his 
violent propensities. The court found that lack of reasonable care 
toward the patient led to the resulting incident and that defendants 
were liable under Section 319 of the Restateaent (Second) of Torts 
describing assuaption of care of another individual. Nonetheless, 
the court did not define "reasonable care." In footnote 5 of the 
opinion, the court cites Tarasoff but still expresses its 
uncertainty as to the aeaning of the decision: 
We observe, without deciding, that those jurisdictions which 
perait an action on this basis are careful to define the 
standard of reasonable care as that due fro• si•ilar 
professionals in a field where there reaains considerable 
uncertainty of diagnosis and tentativeness of professional 
judgment (p. 785). 
More recently, the March-April, 1988 issue of the Mental and 
Physical Disabilities Law Reporter describes a new Indiana law that 
took effect Septeaber 1, 1987 which iaaunizes particular health 
providers fro• civil liability to third parties. The new provision 
does not hold therapists liable for disclosure of private 
inforaation in an effort to coaply with the duty to warn. That duty 
arises if the patient discloses to the practitioner a real threat of 
actual violence or bar• against a victi• that could reasonably be 
identified or if the patient appears fro• his/her state•ent to pose 
i••inent physical threat to others. The therapist can fulfill 
his/her duties if he/she ~easonably tries to infor• the victta. if 
he/she reasonably tries to notify the police in either the patient's 
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or victia's area of residence, initiates civil coaaitaent 
procedures, or acts to preclude the use of physical violence to 
others until law enforcement authorities can be contacted. 
Next, the Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District, heard 
Novak v. Rathnaa in 1987. This was on appeal by the plaintiff and 
administrator of the estate of a woman killed by a former aental 
patient during attempted araed robbery. The adainistrator had sued 
doctors who aore than one year earlier had reco•mended that the 
patient be released. Judge Courson, for the tenth Judicial Circuit 
Court, Peoria County, granted the defendants' aotion to dismiss the 
coaplaint. Judge Strouder, for the Appellate Court, ruled that the 
doctors' negligence in •aking the reco•aendation despite knowledge 
that the patient was dangerous, was not the proxiaate cause of the 
injuries that decedent sustained. Judgment was affir•ed. 
Although the crux of this case is the alleged negligent release 
of the patient, so•e aention of a duty to warn was included: "As 
has been done in ... cases that have followed ... Tarasotf (although 
we believe that Illinois would adopt Tarasoff's affir•ative duty ... 
to warn foreseeable third parties) we do not believe ... the duty 
... (to) ... extend to victi•s who are not readily identifiable" (p. 
775). 
The eighth circuit contains Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota. Exaaination of 
the eighth circuit reveals that as of 1983, the Iowa and Missouri 
courts had refused to decide whether or not the Tarasoff rule would 
be adopted. The relevant cases here are Cole v. Taylor (Iowa, 
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1981), Estate of Votteber v. Votteber (Iowa, 1982), and Sherrill v. 
Wilson (Missouri, 1983). 
In 1985, three cases were heard at the federal level. At the 
district level, Anthony v. U.S.A. (Southern District of Iowa/Central 
Division) concerned a voluntarily-adaitted patient, at a Veterans 
Adainistration hospital, who later received privileges to leave 
hospital grounds. He subsequently became part of an autoaobile 
collision in which the plaintiff sustained serious injuries and the 
plaintiff's wife died. Plaintiff here asks that Tarasoff be 
extended. In response, the court cites Brady v. Hopper (1983), 
Leedy v. Hartnett (1981), and Thoapson v. County of Ala•eda (1980), 
to deaonstrate that Tarasoff-type liability should not extend to 
create a duty to protect unspecified, unidentified persons. 
Additionally, Mutual of Oaaha Insurance Co. v. AMerican 
National Bank (1985) was filed in the Minnesota Division of the U.S. 
District Court. This was a case resulting fro• insurers' refusal to 
pay proceeds upon death of naaed insured who was an apparent 
ho•icide victi•. The insurers sought to obtain hospital and •edical 
records of patient who allegedly fraudulently procured the policies. 
The court, in deciding this case, said that the rationale behind the 
physician-patient privilege was the encourage•ent of the patient to 
speak freely with the therapist about personal difficulties. The 
court reviewed the case extensively and found that none of the 
exceptions to the privilege apply. It was said that there •ight be, 
in cases where there is an identifiable victi•. a duty to warn but 
that was not applicable here. The court reasoned that even if there 
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had been a duty on the part of the psychiatrist to warn the 
subsequent victia, this duty would not extend beyond the warning 
itself. The duty would not involve disclosure of records. The 
court coaaented that the privilege and its exceptions were coapeting 
areas of interest, to be weighed on an individual, case-by-case 
aethod. Here, the policy seeaed to favor the privilege, especially 
since there existed no need for a warning to be given. 
At the court of appeals level, Abernathy v. U.S.A. (1985) 
concerned the father of a victia beaten to death by an epileptic 
individual. The father charges that the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
had control of the individual, but the governaent is held not to be 
liable, for fear that the court would be advancing a duty to control 
by psychotherapists. Tarasoff is aentioned in a footnote to show 
how Abernathy is different. For exaaple, the perpetrator in 
Abernathy had never aet, nor threatened the victim. 
The ninth circuit contains Alaska. Arizona, California, Idaho, 
Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, and Hawaii. Other than the 
California decisions already discussed for the Ninth Circuit, 
aention can also be aade of two other cases. The earliest is Sakuda 
v. Kyodoguai (1983), heard by the U.S. District Court, Hawaiian 
division. This case concerned the parents of a riding crew of a 
towed vessel. They brought a wrongful death action against the 
husbandry agent of an oceangoing tug which had towed the vessel, and 
alleged that the agent had negligently serviced the two and 
negligently failed to warn crew aeabers of potential danger. The 
plaintiff here argues that an exception exists to the rule in eases 
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where the defendant stands in a "special relationship" either to the 
person whose conduct needs to be controlled, or to the foreseeable 
victi• of that conduct. Although this case does not involve the 
field of psychology, the plaintiffs nonetheless cited Tarasoff and 
Lipari for support. The district court, in saying that these cases 
were not applicable, held that the agent stood in no special 
relationship to the two so as to give rise to cause of action on 
basis of failure to warn of potential danger. The court concluded 
that if it were to hold such a duty in this case, it would happen 
that almost any relationship between two persons would give rise to 
the duty. 
Peterson v. Washington (1983) was a case where the Washington 
Court of Appeals chose to follow Lipari. Here, the plaintiff was 
injured when her car was struck by the car of a patient recently 
discharged fro• the state hospital. She charged negligence, saying 
that the psychiatrist should have protected her fro• the dangerous 
proclivities of the patient. The court held that the doctor had a 
duty to use reasonable precaution in order to protect anyone who 
•ight foreseeable be threatened by drug-related •ental proble•s. 
The court affir•ed the verdict, finding that the state had a duty to 
protect this plaintiff, and that the psychiatrist had acted 
negligently in failing to take some action that would have protected 
her. 
The tenth circuit contains Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, 
Oklaho•a, Utah and Wyo•ing. Durflinger v. Artiles (1981) was 
decided by the federal district court in Kansas. The court here 
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approved of the lower court's e•ploy•ent of Tarasoff as a grounds 
for its instructions on the standard of care for psychiatrists who 
discharged a •ental hospital patient who, in turn, later killed 
plaintiff's wife and sons. The jury returned a verdict for the 
plaintiffs and the defendants appealed. At the appeal level, in 
1984, this court admitted that it had never adopted the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts Section 315 (1965), but discussed the concept of 
special relationship in for•er cases. Previously, then, the court 
has held that a special relationship or specific duty has been found 
when one creates a foreseeable peril, not readily discoverable, and 
fails to warn. However, the court fails to co•ment further. 
Rather, it finds defendants liable on the duty enco•passed in the 
general duties of physicians and surgeons. The court here 
recognizes as a valid cause of action the clai• that grew out of a 
negligent release of a patient (having violent propensities), from a 
state institution, as distinguished from the negligent failure to 
warn persons who •ight be injured by the patient as a result of the 
release. 
In the same year, 1984, Beck v. Kansas University was decided 
in the Kansas District Court. This was an action ste•aing fro• the 
shooting of two individuals at the University of Kansas Medical 
Center e•ergency room. The plaintiffs here brought an action 
against •e•bers of the Kansas Adult Authority Mental Health Center 
for failing to control or protect third parties fro• their patient. 
Here, the court was convinced that under Kansas law, a duty existed 
on the part of •e•bers of the Adult Authority to protect individuals 
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(who could be expected to be found at the University of Kansas 
Medical Center) fro• foreseeable har• if they knew or reasonably 
should have known of the special danger which the patient posed 
toward those individuals. The court looks back to a recent Kansas 
decision and co••ents that although Durflinger was narrowly drawn, 
the Kansas Supre•e Court suggested that it would allow liability for 
failure to warn. This court relied on the Kansas Supre•e Court's 
approval of Tarasoff and Lipari. 
The hall•ark case in this district, however, and the one that 
has certainly received the •ost national attention is Brady v. 
Hopper (1983), a suit by for•er White House Secretary and other aen 
who had been shot by the defendant psychiatrist's patient, John 
Hinckley, during an assassination atte•pt on President Reagan. This 
suit was filed in the Federal District Court for Colorado. 
The plaintiff's co•plaint pri•arily argues that Hinckley 
presented his psychiatrist with symptoms, abnormal behavior, and 
historical data that should have persuaded Hopper to •ake a •ore 
thorough exa•ination and come to the conclusion that the patient was 
dangerous. The plaintiffs' co•plaint next asserted that the 
psychiatrist's treataent aggravated Hinckley's condition, that the 
psychiatrist should have sought consultation, and that the 
psychiatrist should have warned Hinckley's parents and law 
enforce•ent personnel about John Hinckley's dangerousness. 
The defense tried a two-pronged approach. First of all, Dr. 
Hopper argued that the relationship between hi•self and Hinckley did 
not give rise to a duty. Dr. Hopper relied upon Hasenei, •entioned 
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earlier, in order to substantiate his inability to control the 
patient. 
Secondly, the defendant used the Thompson decision to say that 
there was an absence of a specific threat to a specific person in 
this case. Therefore, Hinckley alerted no one. 
Responding to the defense, plaintiffs argued that the 
relationship between Hopper and Hinckley could not only be 
considered a "special relationship" under the Restate•ent (Second) 
of Torts Section 315, but under other relevant sections of the 
Restatement as well. These included Sections 319 ("Duty of Those in 
Charge of Person Having Dangerous Propensities") and Section 324A 
("Liability to Third Person for Negligent Perfor•ance of 
Undertaking"). Additionally, plaintiffs referred to Lipari v. Sears 
(1980) to clai• that the doctor had an affirmative duty to take 
precautions other than warning for the benefit of others. The 
plaintiffs argued, then. that duties existed not only to foreseeable 
victims but to others in general. 
The court did not agree. When ruling on the •otion, it did not 
consider whether or not the therapist-patient relationship gave rise 
to a broad duty to protect the public, but rather discussed the 
extent to which the psychiatrist was obligated to protect particular 
plaintiffs fro• this particular har•. The court said that 
foreseeability was of pri•ary i•portance. Although the court 
finally decided that the psychiatrist's treat•ent of Hinckley fell 
below the applicable standards of care, the court nevertheless 
concluded that the plaintiff's injuries were not foreseeable. 
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Consequently, the psychiatrist was not held liable. 
Secondly, the court resolved that there was no relationship 
between the defendant and the victi•s fro• which a duty •ight 
follow. Judge Moore said that a special relationship does not infer 
that there are obligations owed to the general public. Goodman 
co1111ents on the case by saying that Judge Moore see•ed to go even 
further than the li•iting holdings in Tho•pson and Megeff. Lastly, 
the court said that there were i•portant reasons to restrain 
therapists• responsibilities. It re•arked: "To iapose upon those 
in the counseling professions an ill-defined 'duty to control' would 
require therapists to be ulti•ately responsible for the actions of 
their patients" (p. 1339). "Hu•an behavior is siaply too 
unpredictable, and the field of psychotherapy presently too 
inexact ... " (cited in Goodman, 1985, p. 224). Goodaan reaarks that 
Judge Moore was probably influenced by policy considerations, but 
wonders what would be the Judge's ruling if it were found that the 
defendant knew or should have known that the plaintiffs would be 
probable victias. 
The eleventh circuit contains Alabama, Florida, and Georgia. 
No federal cases are reported at this tiae. In 1982, the Georgia 
Supreae Court applied Tarasoff, together with Mcintosh and Lipari, 
to establish a duty to control. Here, in Bradley Center v. Wessner 
(1982), the defendant/appellant hospital failed to exercise 
reasonable care, and did not control appellees' father. 
Subsequently, the appellee's •other was killed. The court said 
that in finding the appellant liable it was not creating a tort. 
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The court •aintained that it looked to the state's traditional tort 
principles of negligence in studying the facts of the case. The 
court also co•mented that the duty to respect a standard of conduct 
is recognized as an element of law in other jurisdictions. 
More recently, the January-February, 1988 issue of the Mental 
and Physical Disabilities Law Reporter cited Swofford v. Cooper 
(1987). Here, a Georgia appeals court upheld medical •alpractice 
suits against a psychiatrist whose state hospital patient killed his 
father during a two-week ho•e visit. The patient had been placed in 
the hospital due to hoaicidal tendencies. A pass was approved by 
the psychiatrist for the patient after the patient's 11-•onth stay. 
The trial court had found for the psychiatrist on the ground that 
the patient was contributorily negligent. The court of appeals 
held, however. that the patient could not be held contributorily 
negligent because he was psychotic at the ti•e. The psychiatrist 
was found negligent. Although she argued that the stabbing was 
unforeseeable, the court answered that the doctor should have 
expected some occurrence of violence that would occur as her result 
or omission. 
Finally, the D.C. Circuit offers two cases at the federal 
level. Si•pson v. Braider (1985) was heard in the District Court, 
D.C. Division. This was a diversity action brought against a son 
and his parents to recover for injuries allegedly sustained when 
son, then, a ainor, shot a BB pellet gun fro• an apart•ent window 
and struck plaintiff. The plaintiff sought discovery of parents 
concerning psychiatric treat•ent of son and •oved to co•pel answers 
97 
to deposition questions. The District of Coluabia here studied 
legislative history of the physician-patient privilege to show that 
the purpose of the provision was to place patients and physicians in 
the saae legal relationship as an attorney and his client. An 
exception only occurred in criainal cases where the patient was a 
threat to the public. Thus, there is no exception to the statute 
protection in Siapson, regardless of the aention of aental illness. 
Also, this privilege extends to parents of a ainor in treataent. 
Secondly, the court of appeals in 1986 heard White v. United 
States. Here, the wife of a psychiatric patient brought suit 
against the hospital for injuries she suffered when she was attacked 
and stabbed by her husband after his escape from the hospital. The 
district court held that the husband's psychotherapist did not have 
a duty to warn the wife, and that the hospital was not guilty of 
negligence in allowing patient to enter unsupervised hospital 
grounds. The court of appeals, in relying on Rieser v. D.C. (1977), 
found that the D.C. court has in the past considered a duty to warn. 
The court in White, however, held that the defendant 
psychotherapists were not liable because their assessaent of the 
patient was reasonable. The therapists explained that their patient 
was able to distinguish fantasizing fro• actual haraing of another. 
Furtheraore, the fantasies held by the patient did not represent a 
specific threat to the plaintiff. 
Thus, Tarasoff has had iaaediate and far-reaching iaplications 
for all aental health practitioners. Although studies aay report 
that California therapists seeaed aore affected by Tarasoff, it is 
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inevitable that the subsequent Brady v. Hopper 11t1gat1on has 
increased awareness of this same duty notion and furthered the 
spread of lawsuits alleging the failure to warn. Interesting to 
note ts how some courts have seemed to latch onto certain cases of 
the Tarasoff progeny such as the Tho•pson and Lipari cases. These 
cases have gained notoriety in their own right and have also come to 
serve, on a less popular level, as a representation of what "duty to 
warn" •eans. Tarasoff, with its roots in fundamental negligence 
law, has served to sustain and perpetuate the principles of law 
for•ulated by even the authors of the original Restatement of Torts. 
What needs to be profiled is whether or not Tarasoff ts, or could 
soon beco•e, outdated and burdensome in the present atmosphere of 
•odern aental health specialists. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CURRENT LEGAL IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
As these cases illustrate, there are several proble•s in trying 
to instrumentalize the Tarasoff reasoning. Aaong these are the 
protection of civil rights. the scope of the confidentiality 
promise. the inability to predict dangerousness, the deter•ination 
of what is reasonable care, and the legal burden placed on 
psychotherapists. 
Perhaps it is best to conclude this thesis by showing how well 
therapists are working with a duty to warn and how they are 
incorporating it into their practice. In this way, it •ight be 
shown where develop•ents are still needed to lessen the interference 
with therapy. 
From the courts' perspective. the Tarasoff case represents an 
array of legal theories. As can be seen fro• some of the above 
stated cases. Constitutional due process is an argument appearing in 
recent legal decisions brought against the government. The 
plaintiffs' claims in these cases assert that since the perpetrator 
of the violence was a patient of a governaent-run institution. the 
plaintiffs who were subsequently hurt were deprived of "life and 
liberty" without due process of the law. In aost of these cases, 
however, the courts have held that first of all, the Due Process 
clause is not the proaise of life itself. Secondly, •any of these 
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courts have also found that the governaent in these circu•stances is 
protected by iamunity statutes. Finally, the courts have found that 
a duty to control is different than a duty to warn, and that this 
duty to warn depends on the state's law. Often, the states have 
looked for a "special relationship" and an "identifiable victi•." 
In this way, the courts at least appear to be trying to 
•itigate the possibility that all inforaation about parolees and 
aental health patients be aade readily available and publicized 
without sufficient reason. Yet, there re•ains real confusion about 
the limits of confidentiality and when and to whom it may reaain 
absolute. 
Many of the above cases focus on privilege and coamunication. 
Yet, it is puzzling that if a court ultiaately has a difficult tiae 
deciding what is to be admitted into evidence, a therapist aay be 
required to somehow aake an individual, often iamediate judgment on 
both legal and psychological issues pertaining to his/her client. 
The courts are careful to coament that a therapist does not 
have a legal duty to control. Yet, the therapist does have at least 
a professional and ethical duty, if not a legal duty as well, to 
control the patient's therapy. This happens through the decision of 
whether or not to disclose. There is a definite line between 
controlling and influencing a person's actions. Nonetheless, it is 
a fine line. Therapy should enable a person to see alternatives and 
to recognize the freedom to aake choices. However. the therapist 
would be reaiss if he/she did not atteapt to steer the patient away 
fro• poor, debilitative choices. It is questionable if a patient 
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can come to a genuinely free and individual choice tor a positive 
alternative when threatened with a psychotherapist's legal duty to 
warn. 
What Tarasoff appears to hold is that a therapist can be held 
accountable for another's actions despite a lack of control over the 
person. What therapists are fearing is not the decision whether or 
not to co•mit. (for which they are so•eti•es protected under 
statutory i11J11unities). but the actions of the patient outside of 
their office. THus, the judgments for which therapists are •ost 
capable and for which they should be held •ost accountable are 
exactly those which they can •ake with "discretion." On the other 
hand. they are held accountable for patients' choices that no 
education or preparation entirely anticipates. Perhaps 
psychotherapists are believed to be fortified through their study, 
wisdo• and fa•iliarity with world of crisis. Perhaps they are 
considered strong enough to endure being the scapegoats in an area 
of law not yet fully developed. or yet capable of •eeting its end. 
That is to say that while the Tarasotf decision see•s to have been 
founded on good intentions. it failed to anticipate the problems of 
the holding, especially as to how the duty extends to other kinds of 
•ental health practitioners. Additionally, perhaps psychologists, 
because of their training are expected to •aintain heightened 
sensitivity to the prediction of violence, a capability not 
requested of even police officers who have extensive experience with 
cri•inals. 
There have been several reco .. endations for the confidentiality 
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dile••as fro• Tarasoff. There have also been •any cries for help 
a•ong different areas affected by the decisions. Aaong these pleas 
are those of Donald H. Henderson. author of the article "Negligent 
Liability and the Foreseeability Factor: A Central Issue for School 
Counselors" appearing in the October 1987 issue of the Journal of 
Counseling and Development. He says that in his state. that are no 
guidelines for a counselor to refer to when confronting a troubled 
student. Should he/she refer the student elsewhere and/or notify 
the parents? Also. there seeas to be no adequate suggestions in 
much of the case law about the release of confidential inforaation 
when the student aay inflict danger on hiaself /herself or others. 
Henderson notes. however. that there is sufficient detail relating 
to the conditions under which a psychotherapist •ust disclose. 
Henderson shows that federal statutory law tries to deal with 
this proble• by allowing educational agencies to disclose personally 
identifiable information from the educational records of a student 
to appropriate parties in connection with an eaergency. This kind 
of legislation upholds the co•mon law doctrine of in loco parentis 
and pariens patriae. in which teachers and the state are given the 
right to exercise limited authority over pupils and to be 
responsible for those who are attending educational institutions. 
In the January 18, 1988 edition of Behavior Today, Steven 
Engelberg. legal counsel for the Aaerican Association for Marriage 
and Faaily Therapy, offers his reco .. endations for therapists. who 
are being called upon to testify in court. He advises that a 
subpoena for confidential inf or•ation is not a require•ent that the 
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infor•ation be divulged. Rather, it is only a de•and that the one 
subpoenaed appear with the requested infor•ation. Engelberg says 
that a therapist should demonstrate reluctance to reveal infor•ation 
because it is plainly against the ethical principles of the 
profession and that a therapist should not do so unless ordered to 
testify by the court. If the judge so orders. then the therapist 
can divulge without fear of violating confidentiality. Engelberg 
says that one may be held in conteapt if he/she refuses to co•ply. 
Although confidentiality laws are soaetiaes nebulous, at least 
the availability of statutes eases the therapists' predicament. 
When faced with the issue precedent to the break of confidentiality. 
the determination of dangerousness itself, lawyers and psychologists 
alike are at a loss for support. Where soae courts recognize the 
insubstantial amount of evidence on theories of psychological 
prediction, the U.S. Supreae Court seems to act capriciously in 
relying on psychological data pertaining to the prediction of future 
violence. This is shown in an article by Susan Cunningha• which 
appeared in the Septe•ber 1983 issue of the APA Monitor. In her 
article "High court distorts results of research on dangerousness." 
Cunningham explains that the U.S. Supreae Court aay have been 
incorrect in depending too heavily upon behavioral science research 
in two recent cases. She explains how •ental health practitioners' 
abilities can be artificially heightened through •isinterpretation 
of inforaation. She describes two cases. 
The first case, Jones v. U.S. (1983), was a narrow, 5-4 ruling 
initiated in the District of Coluabia. Facts of the case concern a 
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•an who was caught atte•pting to steal a jacket fro• a depart•ent 
store approxi•ately eight years previous to the publication. At his 
trial. he was successful with an insanity defense and was sent to a 
federal •ental hospital for eight years. Now. Jones is trying to 
gain freedom. 
The case is fraught with a Constitutional ·due process problems. 
burden of proof shifting and confrontation with at least two •ental 
health experts who at least imply that the Court is incorrect in 
their view on •ental health work. 
The crux of the discussion is that the Court's decision in this 
case allows a patient to stay indefinitely at a federal •ental 
hospital for reasons of insanity, even though that patient may not 
be dangerous to society. Although civil co•mit•ent hearings in the 
district require the governaent to give a preponderance of evidence 
that the defendant is dangerous, the burden to prove that defendant 
is not dangerous shifts to defendant in cri•inal cases. That is to 
say that a cri•inal defendant with an insanity defense is 
auto•atically presumed to be dangerous, and subject to commit•ent. 
unless he can prove otherwise. Jones apparently had been given the 
opportunity to prove hi•self. but these details were not described 
in the article. 
Allong the opponents of the Court's decision was a District of 
Coluabia public defender who argued that the Constitutional 
provisions of due process require the government to let go of Jones 
or to turn to civil co••it•ent proceedings after one year. Another 
opponent is psychologist John Monahan of the University of Virginia 
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who argues that it is virtually iapossible to predict future 
dangerousness even in those situations where an individual has 
coaaitted a violent act in the past. Also, the prediction is weaker 
still when, as in the Jones case, there has been no previous violent 
episode. 
The person who really seems to have taken a hold on this view 
was Justice Brennan who wrote the dissent for Jones. He quoted 
Monahan frequently and argued directly against the aajority's 
contention by saying "even if an insanity acquitee re•ains •entally 
ill. so long as he has not repeated the saae act since his offense, 
the passage of tiae diainishes the likelihood that he will repeat 
it" (p. 3). However, the •ajority of the Court sustained its 
holding that a cri•inal action dictates dangerousness, and the 
ruling stands. Monahan proposes that this aore liberal finding on 
the criteria for dangerousness could influence lower courts and 
create obstacles to release for those who are civilly coaaitted. 
An interesting twist is that the court in Jones see•ed to be 
indifferent to aental researchers but supported •ental health 
experts in a second case, Barefoot v. Estelle (1983) decided at 
approxiaately the saae time. 
Estelle is a Texas case concerning a aurderer who challenged 
the coapetencies of the two psychiatrists who deterained that he 
would be dangerous. Not only did the high court state that 
psychiatrists as a class were capable of judging potential violence, 
but also held that the doctors could even aake a judgaent on 
hypothetical profiles of the defendant, while absent actual 
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examination of the defendant himself. What is interesting to note 
is that the Estelle case is at least the second time in judicial 
authority that Texas has been allowed to acknowledge low reliability 
and prejudicial impact of expert testiaony as to future 
dangerousness. while proceeding with the evidence. In both cases, 
the APA filed an amicus curiae brief for the defendant and lost. 
The Court's majority, according to this article, seems to be 
saying that compromising, even in death penalty situations, is 
acceptable. Justice White, of the aajority, wrote: "Neither 
petitioner nor the Association suggest that psychiatrists are always 
wrong with respect to future dangerousness" (cited in APA Monitor, 
1983, p. 3). Leonard Rubenstein, of the Mental Health Law Project, 
found this reasoning in opposition to the rules of evidence. He 
implied that it would be admitting false testiaony to include the 
testi•ony of an.expert witness whose statements are "predicated on 
the belief that he is likely to be more wrong than right" (cited in 
APA Monitor, 1983, p. 3). 
Siailar to Jones, Estelle presents problems of due process. 
John Duncan, of the Texas American Civil Liberties Union, says that 
untruths were absolute denials of constitutional guarantees. 
Consequently. the Texas chapter of the ACLU also filed an aaicus 
curiae for the defendant. 
Of the court. Justice Blackmun seeaed to be the aost outspoken 
for the dissent. He made a differentiation that, in his eyes, would 
allow expert witness testi•ony: "One may accept this in a routine 
lawsuit for money damages, but when a person's life is at stake--no 
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aatter how heinous his offense--a requirement of greater reliability 
should prevail" (cited in APA Monitor, 1983, p. 3). Secondly, he 
pointed out that the witness testimony used here did not even 
qualify as expert testimony. He said that one of the criteria, that 
the state of scientific knowledge in the area be established and 
accepted by the scientific coaaunity, was absent. Judge Blackaun 
was very disturbed by the 11ajority's opinion. "Ulti11ately," he 
said. "when the Court knows full well that psychiatrists' 
predictions of dangerousness are specious, there can be no excuse 
for iaposing on the defendant, on pain of his life. the heavy burden 
of convincing laymen of the fraud" (cited in APA Monitor, 1983, p. 
3). 
Another daaaging effect pointed out is that even the 11ajority 
•embers in this case were aware that the two psychiatrists who 
testified against the defendant sy11bolized a minority within the 
profession. One was named "Dr. Death" or the "Killer Shrink" by 
Texas defense attorneys. He represented that he was "100 percent 
and absolute" that defendant would become violent again. 
Although Blackmon pointed out the lack of expertise on the part 
of these doctors. the Court countered by saying that cross-
exaaination and defense expert witnesses could be provided for a 
counterbalance. Blackmon responded by saying that the jury doesn't 
always properly decide the merits of an expert witness. He recalled 
studies that show the tendency of jurors and judges to accept 
scientific testimony without proper exaJ1ination. Nonetheless. 
Justice White of the 11ajority said that "There is no doubt that the 
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psychiatric testi•ony increased the likelihood that the petitioner 
would be sentenced to death .... But this fact does not •ake that 
evidence inad•issible," (cited in APA Monitor, 1983, p. 3). 
The Barefoot opinion, according to this article. •eans that 
states can decide individually the •eans of regulating expert 
testi•ony in capital cases if they decide to regulate. Even •ore 
devastating is the Supre•e Court's reasoning that juveniles •ay be 
held in custody before a "trial" on the allegations against them. 
Recently, (Nove•ber 1984), the APA Monitor presented Susan 
Cunningham's article entitled "Preventive detention law seen as 
setback for youth and blow to science." Here, it was shown that the 
recent Supre•e Court's ruling allows states to detain juvenile 
suspects before trial and is indifferent to recent research on 
predicting violent behavior. According to juvenile justice 
advocates, says Cunningha•, it also serves to inhibit attempts to 
81leliorate jail conditions for juveniles. In light of the loco 
pariens theory •entioned before, the Schall v. Martin (1984) case 
allowing preventive detention was viewed not to be punishment and 
not denial of due process because juveniles are always in some kind 
of custody. 
Mental health practitioners arguing from a legal standpoint may 
assert that the average citizen who •akes a threat is not subject to 
others' scrutiny while others who are •aking a responsible choice by 
seeking therapy i•plicate the•selves by being honest with their 
therapist. So•e •ental health practitioners •ay see this 
possibility a deterrent to those needing therapy. On the other-
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hand, others •ay state that patients' reporting feelings of violence 
after a therapist's warning are people truly wanting help and 
protection for the•selves and others. If clients, aware of their 
choice to drop counseling at any point, proceed with therapy after 
having been given a warning about a possible break in 
confidentiality, they are •aking the future decision to be subject 
to interrogation about violence. In fact, so•e •ay even be 
encouraged to continue therapy by using the warning about potential 
violence as a catalyst for discussion of that very problem. 
Maybe •ental health practitioners are being forced into 
thinking that they are controllers and predictors. If legal 
require•ents expand even further, the patient •ay in turn fall into 
a false belief syste• about hi•self /herself and begin to believe 
that he or she is really dangerous. Consequently, the helping 
professions might facilitate the belief that •ental health patients 
are dangerous and uncontrollable. This •ay also di•inish patients' 
taking responsibility for their actions. 
These predictions should not •aterialize if, as the courts 
assert, reasonable care is followed. Tarasoff, as explained in 
Doyle v. U.S.A., held that psychotherapists are entitled, within 
bounds of professional co•petence, to broad discretion as well as to 
the •anner in which they conduct exams. Each practitioner's 
sequence of activities is usually respected and not questioned as 
long as he/she includes those essential to therapy. 
The courts see• to be saying two things at once. It appears 
that although counsel support rehabilitation of cri•inals, they 
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would like to base that rehabilitation on a regimen, a structure, a 
litany of requireaents that can be found within the Restateaent. As 
was seen. however, the Restateaent contains contradictory 
provisions. aany exceptions and n1111erous overlaps. Some states have 
still not adopted fully the Restateaent reasoning in their Tarasoff 
cases. 
Reasonable care is not an easy definition. Yet, in light of 
the fact that violence is hard to predict, reasonable care re•ains a 
key coaponent to finding liability. Behavior Today (Dece•ber 28th-
January 4th, 1988) aade •ention of a paper presented at a APA 
conference by David L. Shapiro who stated that "Review of recent 
court decisions highlight the fact that ... legal liability of the 
•ental health professional rarely ... is due to ... failure to 
predict dangerousness, but rather (to) the failure to do an 
assessaent on which a decision ... •ay be based" (p. 6). Although 
only this stateaent is included in order to represent Shapiro's 
paper, it appears safe to assume that Shapiro believes in using a 
diagnostic procedure, rather than the course of therapy, in order to 
handle the duty problem. In short. he seems to hold that •ore 
sophisticated intake procedures, capable of readily identifying 
dangerous propensity, •ay alleviate practitioners' anxieties. 
Paul S. Appelba1111, M.D .• contributed to Beck's edited book 
through "I•plications of Tarasoff for Clinical Practice" (p. 93) and 
"Rethinking the Duty to Protect" (p. 109). Each enco•passes the 
factors already aentioned, while aaking a co .. ent on reasonable 
care. In the latter chapter, the describes the proble•atic effects 
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of Tarasoff at four stages: (a) prior to the initiation of therapy, 
(b) during the usual course of therapy, (c) when the therapist 
suspects the patient •ay intend to co••it a violent act, and (d) 
when a suit is brought alleging that the duty to protect has been 
breached. 
In the first category, Appelbau• suggests that decisions on the 
duty to protect will deter patients from seeking needed psychiatric 
care. Although studies are sparse, Appelbaum argues that recent 
studies have shown that patients place a high value on the 
protection of their revelations. AppelbaUll anticipates that not 
only will potentially-violent patients be deterred fro• getting 
treat•ent, but that •ental health practitioners will also begin to 
cease treating potentially violent patients. 
In the second category, AppelbaUll fears that therapists •ay 
begin putting inappropriate e•phasis on exploring patients' violent 
fantasies, thereby ignoring other valid areas of concern. Appelbaum 
refers to a study illustrating this pheno•enon. He further co••ents 
that this sa11e study indicated so•e therapists' refusal to confront 
violent propensities for fear that they, as therapists, would be 
required to take action. Appelbaum is concerned that the Tarasoff 
proble• •ight be an unnecessary distraction to therapists who become 
preoccupied with potential liability and fail to deal 
therapeutically with clients. 
In the third category, Appelbaum is concerned that Tarasoff 
effects tend to influence overprediction. When joined with the 
therapist's uncertainty, "unnecessarily intrusive but potentially 
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•ore secure alternatives (such as involuntary co••itaent) will 
frequently be chosen" (p. 115). Finally, Appelbaum concludes that 
there aay not be any aeasure•ent at all as to predicting 
dangerousness. "Nor are the courts in a position to impose a 
standard of care, as they have in other areas of aedical practice, 
such as informed consent. because they are equally at a loss to 
suggest how prediction •ight be accoaplished" (p. 116). Appelbaum 
points out that the court's failure to identify "reasonable steps" 
to protect a third party creates aore obstacles to therapist's 
practice. The crux of the problem in this area is that Tarasoff and 
other decisions state that a lay standard of reasonableness. rather 
than a professional standard of behavior should apply. He points 
out that the jury aay construct too coaprehensive a picture, and 
that a subsequent occurrence of violence would •ean that "all 
reasonably necessary steps were not taken" (p. 116). Appelbaum 
explains that there is always another step that can be taken in any 
situation. The absence of a professional standard increases 
therapists' frustration in independently deciding whether they have 
done enough. If a professional standard were available for 
therapists, practitioners would have a defense in having satisfied 
the recommendations. 
In light of all the criticism that AppelbaUll has for the 
Tarasoff requireaents, he decides to construct his own overview of a 
proposal. In the preface to his proposal, he states that first and 
foreaost, therapists have a aoral duty to protect third parties. It 
is a aoral duty which encoapasses and surpasses the le2al duty.· 
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Appelbau•'s definition of a •oral duty 1s a belief "that hu•an 
beings in an organized society face a •oral i•perative to co•e to 
the assistance of their fellow hu•an beings whose safety is 
endangered" (p. 117). Appelbaum co••ents, though, that "there is 
often no way to keep the •oral obligations of a psychotherapist from 
being translated into legal standards" (p. 118). 
The duty that Appelbau• perceives is fourfold. The first part 
of this duty should be to collect infor•ation relevant to an 
evaluation of the patient's potential dangerousness as found under 
accepted professional standards. He suggests that these standards 
entail deter•ining whether or not the patients have engaged in 
violence or •ade threats of violence in the past. Appelbaum points 
out the unfortunate side of court deliberations when the judges and 
juries tend to scrutinize records of treatment after a violent act 
has occurred. Appelbau• thinks that it is unfortunate that 
indications of dangerousness can usually be found in these 
circu•stances, but are not readily revealable when the therapist is 
conducting the interview. A history of past violence, then, see•s a 
good criterion and an easy de•arcation line. 
At the time that a violent act beco•es i•minent. Appelbaum 
suggests that the therapist should be required to obtain appropriate 
information of the professional standard for dangerousness. Despite 
the lack of solid data regarding predictions of dangerousness, 
Appelbaum offers a co•promise through saying that "consensus can be 
achieved as to which infor•ation allows the best possible 
predictions of dangerousness to be •ade, even as we acknowledge that 
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those predictions are often highly inaccurate" (p. 122). He see•s 
to be saying that •ost professionals will agree that particular 
characteristics lead to dangerousness •ore often than not. 
Appelbawa disagrees with Justice Mosk's reco .. endation that 
therapists are only held accountable for failure to warn when they 
first have come to a conclusion that their patient is dangerous, 
and, secondly, when they then fail to take steps necessary to 
prevent the danger. He suggests that the view is too vague and •ay 
even encourage therapists not to coae to a conclusion about their 
patients' dangerousness. Instead of the Mosk rule. then, Appelbaum 
suggests a standard where professional guidelines need not be 
determined. Rather, re•edies could be obtained where there was 
"outrageous neglect of professional and co••on sense" (p. 124). In 
this way, only clinicians acting in reckless disregard of the 
evidence would be held negligent. The art of "defensive psychiatry" 
(p. 124) would be lessened. 
Once a therapist deter•ines that a patient •ay be violent 
toward others, the duty to protect requires the clinician to take 
reasonable steps to safeguard potential victi•s. The court of 
action, according to AppelbaU.11 should rest on a "reasonable care" 
•ode!. "As long as therapists are held to a genuine professional 
standard of care-in contrast to Tarasoff's lay standard- ... they 
should be able to select any reasonable option or coabination of 
options with the assurance that liability will not ensue" (pp. 125-
26). Appelbaua adds that •any ele•ents constitute reasonable 
behavior. These include availability of resources, support staff, 
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ti•e. and •oney. With consideration of these factors. reasonable 
care •ight be concluded from the •aximum use of the•. Thus. 
Appelbaum concludes that therapists' actions would be judged by a 
professional standard of care except in those areas of prediction 
for dangerousness where no •eaningful professional standards have 
yet developed. 
In his other chapter, "Implications of Tarasoff for Clinical 
Practice," Appelbaum states •any of the sa•e propositions as above 
but places special emphasis on assessment procedures, along with 
selection of a course of action and implementation. Focus will be 
on the first only because Appelbaum states that the •ost crucial 
weakness a•ong therapists is inadequate assess•ent. He asserts that 
the best protection for therapists •ight not be an attempt to 
predict liability, but a concerted effort to obtain sufficient 
information for reasonable clinical care. He offers three 
co•ponents to a substantial intake. The first includes a history 
and biographical sketch of the person. Factors to be included are 
age, sex, race, socioecono•ic status, history of substance abuse, 
intelligence, education and residential/employment stability. A 
second co•ponent is assessing the psychological functioning of the 
patient as it is linked to the ability to control violent impulses 
(e.g. co••and hallucinations). The third co•ponent includes 
studying the environmental circu•stances that are prone to provoke 
or inhibit the expression of violent impulses. 
Appelbaum admits that research about prediction of violence is 
aabiguous. He co••ents that not only is there an absence of such 
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studies, but that ethical and legal considerations prevent even the 
aost feasible designs to be tested. Appelbaum coaaents, however, 
that Monahan's work in the field has shown that aany aental health 
practitioners feel capable of predicting violence that occurs within 
hours or days of the session as opposed to that occurring within 
weeks or •onths. Appelbaum co•aents that this differentiation 
exists because i••inent violence can be ascertained through present 
mental states and current environmental decisions. Perhaps this 
kind of demarcation could serve as a component in a standard for 
reasonable care. Still, Appelbaum says that even these short-term 
predictions have no genuine accuracy at this ti•e. 
In the chapter, "Overview and Conclusions," Beck aakes his own 
suggestions to therapists in the wake of the Tarasoff controversy. 
He says that initially, the psychiatrist should have a thorough 
discussion with the patient about the patient's intentions, •ake a 
thorough assessment of the patient's aental status and then consult 
with a colleague. Beck suggests that in so•e cases it •ay even be 
possible to bring in the proposed colleague for a three-party 
conference. If not, Beck suggests calling the victi• on the phone 
while the patient is present. If such •ethods do not work, then the 
therapist should at least let the patient know what plans he or she 
will •ake to contact the victim. In all cases, according to Beck, 
the therapist should write a note listing his or her assess•ent, 
conclusions and plans for action. 
Like Appelbaum, Beck agrees that the actions of a therapist 
according to Tarasoff should be judged according to a professional 
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standard of negligence and not an ordinary standard. Beck thinks 
that this is appropriate because the Tarasoff duty itself rests on 
the existence of a special relationship. Si•ilarly, a professional 
standard should also be used in deteraining whether or not adequate 
steps have been taken to assure that the course of action has been 
carried out. 
In the August 26th. 1985 newsletter of Behavior Today, an 
article entitled "Professional Differences in Assessing 
Dangerousness" described a study done by Bruce A. Eather. Ph.D. The 
study consisted of reports from 80 doctorally-prepared psychologists 
froa special divisions of the APA and 80 board-certified 
psychiatrists, all licensed to practice in the state of California. 
This was a survey in which each of the subjects received one of two 
specifically-designed fictitious case reports describing an 
individual who demonstrated at least soae degree of disturbance and 
potential dangerousness. Respondents were asked to decide: (a) 
whether or not the individual needed involuntary civil coaaitment 
for legal reasons of being mentally ill and/or dangerous to others; 
(b) the level of dangerousness, and (c) the factor(a) that •ost 
influenced their decision. Additionally, a six-itea questionnaire 
was included for the purposes of surveying psychologists and 
psychiatrists about their attitudes toward areas related to 
voluntary/involuntary coaait•ent. Clinicians were also requested to 
reveal their professional interests, their years licensed and the 
extent of their for•er professional involve•ent in civil co .. it•ent 
proceedings. 
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Eather's study revealed an i•portant nu•ber of differences 
between psychologists and psychiatrists. For exaaple, psychiatrists 
were often more likely than psychologists to involuntarily co•mit 
the presented individual. Bather suggests that this aight be an 
effect of psychiatrists' reliance on a aedical •odel which views 
civil coaait•ent as a valid aove by the state to help the aentally 
ill. Secondly, psychiatrists aay have •ore experience with 
coamitaent proceedings. Psychiatrists also assessed the individuals 
in the sketches as being •ore dangerous than the psychologists did. 
There were also iaportant differences between psychologists and 
psychiatrists in regard to their thoughts about evidentiary 
standards of proof that should apply during co .. itaent hearings. 
Most of the psychologists favored using "clear, cogent, and 
convincing evidence" (p. 3), while psychiatrists usually supported 
the judicial syste•s' aost liberal standard, "preponderance of 
evidence" (p. 3). This latter view seeas to support the fact that 
therapists also are •ore willing to co•mit patients and were found. 
through the study, to see the sample clients as aore dangerous. 
Additional questionnaire infor•ation revealed that neither 
psychiatrists nor psychologists believed that they were "qualified" 
at predicting dangerousness. Each group recognized the other as 
qualified to •ake judgments in regard to so•e deterainations of 
dangerousness. Both refuted the idea of granting lawyers expert 
witness status on such aatters. 
To cite so•e encourage•ent for therapists at this point. the 
Noveaber 12, 1987 issue of Guidepost (of the Allerican Associati,on 
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for Counseling and Developaent) contained an article pertaining to 
liability. Staff writer Naoai Thiers focused on recent iaplications 
of Tarasoff. She assured the reader that the psychologists who have 
studied the problem have found that suits against aental health 
practitioners are still uncoa•on, especially aaong those who are 
ethical. Two authorities upon whoa she relies for her article are 
Paul Snider, an Allerican Mental Health Counselor Association •eaber 
and Burt Bertram. chair of the AACD Insurance Trust. Snider argues 
that the aental health counselor and probably his/her supervisor are 
those aost susceptible to liability. Bertram advises that it is not 
easy to get data on the number of suits pursued against counselors 
because information is not categorized and is often even 
confidential. Bertraa was able to say that AACD's insurer is 
receiving at least 6,000 aore applications for coverage, but an 
increase is not necessarily linked to litigation, especially 
litigation tied to Tarasoff. In fact, Cunningham says that 
counselors are sued aostly for alleged sexual aisconduct. 
Snider recognizes an increasing willingness on the part of 
today's consu•ers to take their therapists to court. Nonetheless, 
he cautions against therapists being preoccupied with the 
possibility of litigation to the extent that fear interferes with 
their counseling. 
Both Snider and Bertram try to see soae good eaanating froa the 
Tarasoff influence. For exaaple, Bertrl!lll said "If there's a silver 
lining it's that we as a profession are going to begin practicing 
with the full recognition that if we overstep our expertise, if we 
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proaise what we can't deliver, we •ay be held accountable" (p. 116). 
Snider agreed by adding therapists are becoaing aore attentive to 
what transpires in therapy sessions. Goal-setting has beco•e 
increasingly i•portant. He recouends "three Rs" to prevent 
litigation rapport with clients, reasonable behavior, and extensive 
record-keeping. Snider continues by stating that having an "open" 
and "honest" relationship with clients is the best safeguard for 
litigation. Rapport, as •entioned in Chapter II of this thesis, 
allows the counselor and patient to be candid with each other and to 
discuss the possibility of consequences. The therapist who has a 
good therapeutic relationship with his/her client is better able to 
evoke the client's true intentions. Reasonable behavior precludes 
potential injury while not alar•ing the client. As long as the 
behavior can be anticipated by the client (as through an earlier 
explanation of warning) and is based on a relationship with the 
client and not on the therapist•s eagerness to avoid liability, 
intervention should not beco•e a problem. Finally, record-keeping 
provides the therapist with concrete evidence of having •et legal 
obligations if he/she faces a lawsuit. 
Appelbaum and Beck seea to concur with what Snider says, 
although each of the foraer has different kinds of suggestions. 
Appelbaua asserts that the initial stage of gathering infor•ation 
(Snider's record-keeping) is the •ost essential part of protection 
fro• liability. At this ti•e. the therapist should pay special 
attention to the client's past and his/her propensity toward 
violence. Beck, on the other band, places e•phasis on the 
121 
relationship with the client (Snider's rapport). He argues that 
Tarasoff-type duties aay be fulfilling by fashioning a clinical 
warning against violence, one which appears to be for the client 1 s 
own welfare. He explains that this approach not only precludes 
threatening the client with the law, but actually serves to 
strengthen the therapeutic relationship, as the therapist appears 
truly concerned about his/her client. Both Appelbau• and Beck agree 
that a aixture of ordinary precautions will adequate protect the 
practitioner fro• liability. Appelbaum says" ... clinicians have 
learned to live with Tarasoff, recognizing that good coa•on sense, 
sound clinical practice, careful documentation, and a genuine 
concern for their patients, are alaost always sufficient to fulfill 
their legal obligations" (p. 106). Similarly, Beck coaaents that 
"there is reason to believe that we can identify aost potentially 
violent patients. If we rely on our clinical judgment and use good 
sense, we will serve our patients and society well, and protect 
ourselves in the bargain" (p. 138). 
In returning to the beginning of this thesis and Lord Esher's 
"larger proposition" theory, what therapists and lawyers alike •ay 
be trying to do is to show that a relationship iaports duty and 
responsibilities. Unfortunately, the ships used in Esher's 
negligence exaaple are easier to steer and guide than people, and 
aany professionals hold contrary viewpoints as to the extent of 
carrying out this duty and the nuaber of people to whom it should 
apply. 
Counsel aay cling to the layaan's standard of "reasonable 
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care." At present, that see•s to be the overwhel•ing consensus, but 
this writer fears that even this standard will be subject to further 
subdivision and categorization in the ti•e to co•e. In addition to 
the expert witnesses already being used, reasonable care •ight be 
further defined by the elitis• of the profession. Those 
professionals with the least education and experience in the •ental 
health field would becoae •ost vulnerable to liability. 
Additionally, courts •ay look to whether or not the profession is 
regulated. Those particular professions not enjoying licensure. 
certification nor registration aay be aore vulnerable to liability 
suits for negligence because they have no professional standards on 
which to rely. 
The ultimate separation of classes can also be understood from 
a practical view. For exaaple, a therapist without a •edical or 
advanced graduate degree aay be seen by juries or finders of fact as 
less capable or knowledgeable. This hypothesis aay be draaatized 
when expert witnesses with consuamate degrees are called in to 
testify against the therapist. It is conceivable that the experts 
would set out additional, reasonable steps that the therapists did 
not consider. If these ra.11ifications becaae prevalent today, 
patients aay begin to avoid therapists altogether. Similarly, 
therapists would begin to surrender their own clients. As 
therapists and counselors often rely on authorities such as 
psychologists and psychiatrists for consulting purposes, it is not 
difficult to see therapists' increased reliance on these 
professionals, especially in duty-to-warn situations. The 
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independence of the aore conteaporary therapies aay falter and 
clients who are seen as potentially dangerous may be given referrals 
by their own therapists to doctors and psychologists owning aore 
credentials. Eather's study already showed clear differences 
between aedical mental health therapists and psychologists. 
Additionally, a recent article in the March-April, 1988 issue of 
Social Work aagazine responded that social workers as a group are 
•ore likely than either psychologists or psychiatrists to breach 
confidentiality in certain situations. The study that was conducted 
was si•ilar to Eather's work. It included a survey based on 10 
vignettes which concerned the breaking of confidentiality. Results 
showed that social workers are aore likely than psychiatrists or 
psychologists to adait that they will disclose confidential 
inforaation when asked about the specified clinical situations. No 
aention was •ade in the article as to the nature of these vignettes. 
There were no i•portant relationships between the responses and 
gender or exposure to clients. 
more likely to keep confidence. 
Older social workers, however, are 
The authors conclude that these 
results aay reflect the nature of social workers' professions. 
Social workers' roles are aore nebulous and their experience with 
cases concerning potential hara is aore liaited than that of 
psychiatrists and psychologists: "Presented with socially 
threatening behavior, social workers' position is relatively aore 
vulnerable and probably more aabiguous than that of colleagues in 
psychiatry or psychology to whoa they aust report" (p. 158). 
If one of the purposes of the behavioral science professions is 
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to create helping relationships, there should be so•e forethought by 
the courts to protect these therapies. Other than financial 
differences, so•e clients inevitably prefer talking with a "social 
worker," instead of a "psychiatrist" because the latter is still 
someti•es a sy•bol of sickness and serious •aladjust•ent. 
Similarly, so•e people will only talk to priests or religious 
advisers in the hope of avoiding •ental health therapists 
altogether. If the ability to find liability for negligence among 
these professions continues, both client and counselor will shy away 
from forming helping relationships. The counselor will fear 
ulti•ate lawsuits with each personal encounter. The clients will 
fear disclosure of problems that need discussing. In short, those 
in need of help would not get it, and the actual violence that is 
feared would not be curtailed. In addition, the now-burgeoning 
field of new therapies •ight begin to deflate as practitioners began 
to balance the constant threat of liability against only the 
potential of a rewarding and fulfilling career. 
In Durflinger, it was assured that negligence •ay not 
ordinarily be found short of serious error or •istake. It is 
difficult to ascertain during therapy precisely what makes a serious 
error or •istake. Unfortunately, according to Beck, courts often 
see a "serious" error with perfect, retrospective vision at 
subsequent court hearings. In Lord Esher's ti•e, serious error •ay 
have been the collision of two boats whose captains anticipated the 
crash. But the collision a11ong people and the bar• done by 
individuals to one another is currently i .. easurable and 
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unpredictable. Perhaps a step toward preventing what is only 
thought to be a dangerous situation •ay •erely delay, not te•per a 
furor. As seen in the Tarasoff case, Poddar left therapy shortly 
after being stopped and questioned by police. Feelings powerfully 
tinged with anger and violence that are addressed, but left 
unexplained, are less apt to lose their forcefulness. An e•phasis 
on legal punish•ent and punitive reaction only heightens the 
confusion among mental health patients. Such an at•osphere can lead 
to greater psychological sickness and an even larger propensity 
toward uncivilized and destructive behavior. 
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Suaaary of People v. Poddar 
The cri•inal case of People v. Poddar (1969) contained facts 
very siailar to those specified in the civil case of Tarasoff. 
Initially, Poddar was convicted by the Superior Court of Alaaeda 
County. The defense appealed on the goals of iaproper jury 
instructions. The case on appeal can be divided into two aajor 
parts, each having several coaponents. The first part concerns 
argU11ents for and against the inclusion of testiaony and evidence on 
behalf of Poddar. 
Appellant asserts that the court should have instructed the 
jury on unconsciousness for a coaplete defense. According to 
precedent in California, the court is obliged to instruct the jury 
on law principles which have a close connection with the facts of 
the case. What is needed is substantial evidence to apprise the 
trial judge of plausible issues. 
The defense counsel asserts two eleaents relating to 
unconsciousness. One is the testiaony of a neurologist who exaained 
Poddar's electroencephalograa and found a teaporal lobe lesion. a 
defect which aay relate to uncontrollable seizures of which the 
defendant is not aware. The appeals court disaissed the aremaent, 
re•inding the defense counsel that the infor•ation had initially 
been used to explain proble•s in controlling aggressiveness, and had 
not been used to reflect unconsciousness. 
A stronger criterion is the testi•ony of one of the 
psychiatrists, Dr. Grossi, who testified that the defendant's 
psychotic state did not allow the defendant to understand the 
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killing. When asked about the issue of consciousness. Dr. Grossi 
explained that he had not used that specific ter•. 
Finally, the court of appeals found that a defense of 
unconsciousness should not have been included in the jury 
instructions because trial counsel itself requested fro• the jury a 
verdict of •anslaughter in the opening argu•ent. Unconsciousness is 
a co•plete, and not a partial defense. It could not be used 
independently in a •anslaughter verdict. 
The second co•ponent under Part 1 concerns the exclusion of the 
testiaony of the anthropologist. As •entioned in the text of this 
thesis, defense counsel offered to show that an expert witness 
holding a degree in social sciences, and having the experience of 
living in India for several years, could de•onstrate that Poddar's 
status as an "untouchable" directly led to his diminished capacity. 
The court refused the witness an opportunity to draw the analogy, 
suggesting that the witness only be allowed to answer hypothetical 
questions about Poddar's cultural adaptation. The court reasoned 
that diminished capacity is a •ental illness and could only be 
thoroughly diagnosed by those in the respective field. The court 
further explained that allowing such testi•ony would open a 
floodgate of testi•onies which would only confuse the jury. The 
court also co .. ented that stress regarding cultural differences had 
already been accounted for by Poddar'a psychiatrists. 
The last two ele•ents of Part 1 include arguments against 
exclusion of testi•ony about Poddar's behavior after the killing, 
and inclusion of testi•ony by a court appointed psychiatrist. 
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Regarding the for•er, the court had not allowed the testi•ony of a 
lay witness na•ed Mr. Martinez who supposedly would offer evidence 
that he had seen defendant talking to hi•self approxi•ately four 
•onths after the killing. The court of appeals aff ir•ed the 
exclusion, saying that it had been too re•ote in ti•e and that the 
testi•ony of the defendant's state of •ind had already been 
extensive. 
The defendant clai•s that the latter proble•, the testi•ony of 
a Dr. Peschau, should not have been allowed because the record does 
not specify that Poddar had been allowed to re•ain silent or had had 
a right to counsel before the interview co••enced. The court of 
appeals said that no prior objection to this testi•ony had been •ade 
and that the issue could not be raised for the first ti•e on appeal. 
Further•ore, Dr. Peschau's testi•ony did not contain any 
incri•inating state•ents •ade by the defendant. 
Part 2 of the case at the court of appeals concerns the 
instructions to the jury on different charges, a•ong these first 
degree aurder. Defense counsel asserts that although the verdict 
was of second degree •urder, it was error that the court instructed 
the jury on first degree •order because the very instruction •ade it 
less likely that the jury would find the lesser degree of 
•anslaughter. The court of appeals does not hold that there was 
such a likelihood in this case. The court cites nine indications of 
pre•editation in this case. Defense counsel suggests that the 
pre•editation is inextricably linked with the inability of the 
defendant to conduct calculated decisions and cannot be regarded as 
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genuine planning of a cri•e. In furtherance of their stand, the 
court relies on the record to show that the jury took extensive ti•e 
in reaching its decision, specifically in considering second degree 
•urder and •anslaughter. First degree •urder did not see• to be at 
issue and so it does not appear that the decision was reached by 
co•pro•ise. 
The next co•ponent of Part 2 was applicant's contesting the use 
of instruction on involuntary •anslaughter which arises fro• sudden 
quarrel or heat of passion. Appellant asserted that there is no 
evidence on this subject and that the defense is not arguing for a 
heat of passion defense allowed to a person of ordinary 
sensibilities. Appellant contends that giving the instruction was 
error. The court of appeals affir•s that this was error but states 
that in order to consider whether or not it was prejudicial, it •ust 
be considered in coabination with the error in instructing on second 
degree •urder. 
The discussion on this instruction is fairly extensive. 
Briefly, the conflict is over two sets of jury instruction on second 
degree •urder that were given. The first, CALJIC No. 8.30 
(California Jury Instruction Cri•inal. Nu•ber 8.30) allows second 
degree •urder when there is an intent to kill, but one which is not 
as fully deliberated as that belonging to first degree •urder. The 
second set of jury instructions, CALJIC No. 8.31, requires no 
specific intent for second degree aurder if the act involved 
directly caused the killing. Appellant contends that the latter 
instruction should not have been used. Appellant contends that the 
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jury could not find defendant innocent of second degree aurder on 
the basis of the first set of jury instructions because the second 
set of instructions, without intent, allowed the charge. The 
defendant's counsel alleged that the second set of instructions 
should only be used when the underlying felony is independent of the 
killing itself. The court concludes that this instruction also was 
error. 
Despite the errors, the court holds that the conviction of 
felonious homicide is to be sustained. It does, however, reduce the 
charge fro• second degree aurder to aanslaughter. 
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